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Strategic Alliances 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Abstract 
The common literature about strategic alliances offers a very 
fragmented picture. This thesis gives a theoretical overview on strategic 
alliances and builds the basis for the following examination of the 
different dimensions most strategic alliances have. The examination of 
the different dimensions is the crucial point of this thesis. Here the 
reader gets a detailed insight into the different dimensions and the 
implications they have on the design of a particular strategic alliance. 
This examination leads in the end to a more differentiated view on 
strategic alliances and the insight that no simple models exist, which 
give a sufficient basis for decision-making and understanding strategic 
alliances, today. The thesis concludes with an outlook into the future 
and some prognoses what topics have to be examined more carefully. 
1.2 General Introduction 
Since the 1980’s the importance of strategic alliances is growing and 
strategic alliances can be seen as alternatives or complements to 
mergers to achieve more competitiveness. The intensified competition 
in a more and more globalised world leads to the need for new 
possibilities to compete successfully. As solution more cooperative 
strategies were crafted and implemented. Due to this some firms started 
to compete more efficiently and effectively and stayed relatively 
flexible at the same time. This trend is continuing until now and there 
are no signs of changes. The common literature sees alliances as an 
answer on the changing competition: “In a changeable world of 
converging consumer tastes, rapidly spreading technology, escalating 
fixed costs and growing protectionism (…) globalisation mandates 
alliances and makes them absolutely essential to strategy.”1 Or like 
                                                     
1 Backhaus, K. and Piltz, K., (1990), p. 17 
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Peter Drucker, who has been called the father of management theory, 
states: “The greatest change in corporate culture, and the way business 
is being conducted, may be the accelerating growth of relationships 
based not on ownership, bus on partnership.”2 Companies are involved 
in more strategic alliances than ever. The alliances generated sales grew 
from two per cent in 1980 to 19 per cent in 1996 among the Fortune 
1000 companies. The expected sales in 2002 were 35 per cent.3 These 
numbers confirm the trend. 
The merging of the international markets puts high pressures on the 
participants to be present at the market and to foster the own sells. 
International production sites are getting more and more specialized in 
producing one special product to reach economies of scale. 
Additionally, more and more departments of companies are getting 
centralized and research and development is also becoming more and 
more expensive.  
A company, which wants to remain competitive on the future’s global 
markets, needs more than only financial and human resources. It needs 
the ability of understanding alien cultures and languages, it has to be an 
insider in every country, and it has to be able to handle different 
techniques of management. 
To cope all these new requirements for successful competition, many 
companies build strategic alliances in order to aggregate the strengths 
and to realize economies of scale. One might get the impression that 
strategic alliances are a temporary management fashion, but actually 
this restructuring is the consequence of fundamental changes in 
competition. 
To assert themselves in competition, in the past companies tried to 
acquire the needed resources and competences either on their own or by 
2 Drucker, P. (1996) 
3 Thompson, A. and Strickland, A. (2001) 
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merging with another company.4 The standalone-strategy is not always 
practicable in today’s environment anymore, because it requires 
enormous financial resources and is very time-consuming, while the 
final outcome is very unsure. On the other hand the merger meets legal 
restrictions very often and is very inflexible. 
Another possibility, the strategic alliance offers enormous potential. If 
implemented correctly, some authors claim, it can dramatically improve 
an organization’s operations and competitiveness. Companies are 
forming alliances for many different reasons: They want to obtain 
technology, to save costs, to gain access to specific markets, to reduce 
financial risk, to reduce political risk, to achieve or ensure competitive 
advantage and many more. However, while many organizations often 
rush to jump on the bandwagon of strategic alliances, few succeed.5 
Uniform definitions for strategic alliances cannot be found in the 
literature. The understanding of strategic alliances differs a lot. As a 
common basis all definitions mention that strategic alliances are 
cooperative strategies with the goal of achieving synergies and that a 
win-win situation is characteristic for strategic alliances. Partners of 
strategic alliances want to compete more successfully together. One 
reason for this is the extreme heterogeneity of strategic alliances. 
As potential benefits of strategic alliances can be seen that resources of 
the other company can be used and put into business in a more efficient 
way. Also the combination of several resources can be more useful than 
the sum of the individual ones. More parties are involved in the 
business and therefore the overall risk, especially in the research and 
development area, can be lowered.  The individual strengths of each 
side will be recognized and thus learning processes are the result. For 
certain projects a critical size for rentable projects is needed. Strategic 
4 Bronder, C. (1993) 
5 Soursac, T. (1996); Malott, R.H. (1992); Michelet, R. and Remacle, R., 
(1992) 
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alliances help to solve this problem. The bargaining power towards 
suppliers could rise.  
Different goals, motives and the target benefits lead to varieties in 
strategic alliances. These can be described by certain factors or 
perspectives. The relations to the market of the partners of the strategic 
alliance could be investigated and the alliance could be classified in 
horizontal, vertical or lateral. Other factors such as their commitment to 
each other, their expectations, the relation of the size of the partners or 
the way of financial involvement could be used as the starting point to 
classify or describe strategic alliances and develop possibilities to deal 
with the different forms of strategic alliances.  
These differences are a part of the problem to find a clear definition of 
strategic alliances.  Also these differences explain a part of the large 
share of failed strategic alliances. Some authors claim that up to 60 
percent of strategic alliances are failures. But this figure is seen very 
different by different authors. To get an impression of the duration of 
strategic alliances, one can see that about 50 percent end within the first 
four years.6 Therefore some researchers are questioning the strategic 
alliance as a successful instrument for cooperate management. This 
amount of endings does not have to be necessarily a sign for failures 
because some strategic alliances might only be a cooperation with the 
intention last forever. A lot of them are implemented with a limited 
time horizon. So the conclusion that these alliances were failures cannot 
be made. Nevertheless the high ending rate is an indication for 
problems with the handling of strategic alliances. Gerybadze7 talks 
about a widening gap between perceived empirical changes and their 
reflection in theory. Even the increased number of literature about 
strategic alliances in beginning of 1990’s could not close this gap. 
Some aspects of strategic alliances are very well investigated. 
Generally one can find a lot of literature, which is investigating some 
aspects and forms of strategic alliances.  
6 Thompson, A. and Strickland, A. (2001) 
7 Gerybadze, A. (1995), p. 3 
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So the potential for more research in this area is there. Especially a 
broad view is interesting. 
1.3 Topic and Motivation  
During our previous studies we dealt with strategic alliances. We 
attended different courses that covered strategic management in 
general. Due to time restrictions we touched this topic only 
peripherally. Nevertheless we got interested in strategy in general and 
specifically in strategic alliances. So we had an imagination of strategic 
alliances before we started to work for this thesis. The proceeding work 
showed us that strategic alliance is a much broader term than we 
thought before.  
After reading a lot of different literature we discovered that strategic 
alliances are not only a broad term but as well a very differently used 
term. We found a lot of literature that is dealing with different subjects 
concerning strategic alliances. Literature which is forming the different 
subjects in a complete picture is very rare. Either the authors try to 
generalise their results acquired by analysing only a small amount of 
different types of strategic alliances without traceable reasons or they 
do not even try to produce results that are valid for all forms of strategic 
alliances. This motivated us to work in this direction.  
1.4 Formulation of the Problem 
Our task will be to form a more differentiated picture of strategic 
alliances by describing the necessity of strategic alliances, the different 
use of information technology within strategic alliances, and the 
factors, which influence the specific type of strategic alliance. 
The first problem will be to find a definition for strategic alliances. 
From the beginning we will focus on the economic meaning of strategic 
alliances. Strategic alliances in social, war or other context will be 
ignored. Nevertheless social aspects with relevance in the economic 
context have to be analysed. To find a definition different ones have to 
be presented and analysed. Then we have to describe the context in 
which strategic alliances are embedded. The theoretical potential of 
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strategic alliances has to be explained. After this the task is to identify 
the most important aspects concerning strategic alliances. This will start 
with motives for strategic alliances and their scientific backgrounds. 
Then the formation and evolution of strategic alliances will be 
presented and the management process in strategic alliances has to be 
considered. It is also necessary to evaluate which factors are 
influencing the success of strategic alliances, especially considering the 
heterogeneous forms of strategic alliances as described before. 
Therefore different perspectives or factors on strategic alliances have to 
be presented and out of this conclusions have to be made. Hence 
secondary literature has to be used. In the conclusions we will develop 
a more sophisticated model of strategic alliances. 
1.5 Purpose 
When having a look at the common literature, the reader might get the 
impression that strategic alliances are mainly one- or two-dimensional 
and that it is rather simple to decide for a particular form. We will show 
that a narrow perspective on strategic alliances cannot serve as a basis 
for decision-making. Also we will show the high complexity of the 
subject and that the exercise of “easy” less sophisticated decision 
models is not recommendable. As a result a more differentiated view on 
strategic alliances will be developed and we will make clear that 
strategic alliances are actually a multidimensional topic. This view will 
not be complete but it will be an improvement in comparison to the 
existent models. It will provide a useful help for the decision if a 
strategic alliance is an appropriate way to compete. Also this 
differentiated view will help to answer the question how such an 
alliance should be formed and handled in the future. 
1.6 Audience 
First of all our thesis is intended for a scientific or academic audience. 
It helps to understand the high complexity of the subject strategic 
alliances and it helps to create a higher awareness of the influences on 
strategic alliances. Also this thesis can be used as a starting point for 
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further studies. The thesis has a broad view. So there is space for 
further research in different aspects mentioned in the thesis.  
The thesis is no recipe how to create a good strategic alliance. It helps 
to understand the context. So this thesis can be used in practice as well 
to understand the influences on strategic alliances. For decision making 
it will only help indirectly. Nevertheless we think this thesis is helpful 
for both scientific research and practical decision-making. 
1.7 Outline of the thesis 
In chapter 2 the used method will be described. Therefore the 
perspective, the data collection, displacement of the goals, workflow, 
our background and the literature research are presented.  
In chapter 3 the theoretical basis of strategic alliances is displayed. This 
includes the definitions, which can be found in the literature and decide 
for one we will use during our thesis of strategic alliances, and the 
theoretical framework, which justify the building of strategic alliances.  
Chapter 4 outlines the motives for strategic alliances, the risks, the 
evolution process, which has to be monitored closely to be able to use 
the best tools to foster the alliance, the key success factors, which 
decide if an alliance fails or becomes a success, control considerations, 
i.e. measurements, as well as the related environment, which describes 
legal aspects of forming alliances.  
Chapter 5 delineates perspectives and influences on strategic alliances. 
It will show several different ways to distinguish strategic alliances and 
will point out the differences in managing these kinds of different 
alliances. 
A conclusion will be drawn in chapter 6.  
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2 Method8 
The choice of the method is an important element of the whole 
procedure. This choice influences the procedure but will also be 
determined by our own perspectives as well as by our questions, which 
we will focus on. A strategic alliance is a social system, which consists 
of many spheres of influence. As a basis it is important to create a 
understanding why companies enter into strategic alliances and it is 
also essential to know which are these areas of influence and how they 
will work together successfully in the system.  
A summary about the perspective, the methods and data collection we 
are using, our workflow and goals as well as our background and the 
way we did the literature research will be described further on.  
2.1 Perspective  
The perspective of a person influences the way of thinking. The 
framework of considered and unconsidered assumptions determines a 
considerable part of the author’s work. This framework is influenced 
for instance by breeding, experience and our education. Thus, we also 
have to take into account this fact because those described 
circumstances are influencing everybody. We will try to minimize the 
subjective influence in the way of the author’s thinking. By using 
different sources from different countries we will hopefully get a broad 
and therefore less subjective perspective on the topic. Nevertheless the 
thesis is strongly influenced by our own framework. We tried to put in 
many unconsidered and creative ideas by exploiting a lot of fruitful 
discussions and group synergies.  
8 Theisen, M.R. (1993) 
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2.2 Methods and data collection 
In our thesis we try to enlarge theories by dividing different forms of 
strategic alliances in a new way, which will give a deeper 
understanding of different alliances. These different forms are all 
influenced by certain success-factors, which we will analyse. A 
statistical analysis of these factors was not possible because the 
influence of one of many factors is disturbed by others. So, this will be 
a qualitative approach. Qualitative methods aim to catch the specifics 
with the certain subject and its situation. The information that should be 
central in the examination is thereby dependent on the source of 
information obtained. The information is collected under 
circumstances, which are supposed to be rational and up to date. 
Therefore we tried to connect older literature of strategic alliances with 
more recent one. Since our examination is to a great extent a qualitative 
one, we also cannot consider the measurements as quantitative.   
Because of these circumstances, which are further explained in chapter 
2.2.6, this thesis of theoretical nature and not of an empirical one. So, 
neither deductional nor inductional nor abductional methods will be 
used. 
For our approach we used primarily secondary data. In the beginning of 
our thesis we thought about getting some information from different 
companies by conducting a survey. But after further discussions in our 
group and in class we revised it because it is difficult to receive useful 
primary data during the short time we had. The depth of our study and 
the needed information are mostly confidential and the companies are 
probably not willing to provide this information as we learned in 
different previous studies. Also the fact that we would have to evaluate 
at least a hundred useful surveys to draw a conclusion out of it, made 
that impossible. There is also always the risk that the respondent gives 
conscious or unconscious information about his or her company. The 
interpretation of the questions could be also the wrong one. So this 
would influence such a theoretical work in a wrong way.  
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We have used all kinds of secondary data such as case studies, articles 
and books. Afterwards we read and selected the usable sources to 
provide us with good knowledge. To judge sources there are three 
criteria that can be used: 
1. Asking for topicality, which means that we have tried to find 
literature, which is not older than from the nineties. But still, 
there are older sources that are still of interest.  
2. Tendency-critic, which means that the sources that are read 
include subjective influence, which will falsify the coverage. 
The American literature tends to include such a subjective 
opinion. Therefore we complemented our literatures with those 
from other countries.  
3. Dependency-critic, which means that it is important to proof if 
the used sources are interdependent. But there is the problem 
that many authors are building up their opinions on theories of 
others. Therefore we selected a broad range of sources. 
In summary we can say that our thesis is a qualitative theoretical work.  
2.3 Displacement of goals 
We were first thinking about investigating new connections empirically 
by working together with different companies. We recognized very 
early that we could not reach the companies we needed to investigate to 
create new hypotheses out of the empirical work as mentioned before. 
At the same time we discovered that there is a lot of potential for 
theoretical work based on secondary literature. Especially the 
unreasonable generalisations, which can be often found in the literature, 
give space for a more complete picture of strategic alliances.   
As our framework we name several different models about strategic 
alliances.  
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2.4 Workflow 
After some brainstorming and meetings we found out that the literature, 
the sources and our own conclusive and creative work changed during 
the workflow in nearly every step. To filter and find the right literature, 
which had to fit in our concept, took a long time. In the beginning of 
our work we tried to create a rough structure. Over the time the 
structure continuously changed and became more detailed. Single small 
parts were processed by single group members and in the following 
discussed, evaluated and judged by the whole group and if necessary 
replaced or discarded.  
On the way to a more differentiated view of strategic alliances several 
steps have to be taken, as described in the introduction.  
The criteria will be summarized and described. Then we will try to 
allocate certain factors like success, motives, evaluation, evolution, 
formation, examples and problems to the single groups. Of course, for a 
differentiated view, we also have to take restrictions and problems into 
account. Finally, a conclusion out of all will be drawn. 
2.5 Our background 
We are three students from Germany. We come from Berlin and 
Munich and study as exchange students at the Lund University for one 
year. One of us wants to graduate there. Two of us are studying 
business and engineering and one is studying business administration. 
The Lund University, especially our facilitator Gösta Wijk, enables us 
to write this thesis by offering the opportunity to write this thesis in 
English. We are thankful to get this chance. 
During spring 2003 we decided to write our examination paper on the 
topic of strategic alliances. Strategic alliances became very popular in 
the past and are still a “burning” subject. We touched this topic during 
our business studies in Germany but our knowledge about strategic 
alliances was still quite moderate. However, our background provided 
us with sufficient prerequisites to acquire more knowledge about that 
subject. We critically and analytically read the same material and have 
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maintained objectivity and neutrality by not suppressing circumstances 
or overemphasizing dispensable facts. Objectivity is in any case the 
basis for giving a more differentiated view about strategic alliances.  
2.6 Literature research 
The search for material was an ongoing process, from the beginning of 
the thesis until the end. To write a theoretical paper in the most possible 
objective view, it is firstly important to get a good overview about the 
available literature. The more we worked into a certain topic the more 
material occurred. We started the literature research here at Lund 
University at the university library and “Ekonomiska Bibliotheket” 
(“UB 1” and “UB 3”). At these libraries we were using computerized 
support, i.e. the “LOLITA” and “ELIN” system. By using several key 
words we found several sources, but only one very old English book 
and some specific articles were available at the Lund University. Due to 
time restrictions we were unable to order books from other Swedish or 
international Libraries because this would have taken 2-3 weeks. The 
articles helped us later when we got deeper in the writing. But it did not 
help us in the research for common literature. Therefore we had to find 
other ways to get some useful literature. It was also a task to find 
current literature. After a while our sources incorporated databases 
from the Technical University of Berlin and the University of Passau 
where we used the OPAC research system and the BVB (“Bayerischer 
Bibliotheksverbund”). We also received very good literature, i.e. books 
and articles in magazines like the Harvard Business manager, from our 
colleagues in Switzerland who are studying at the University of St. 
Gallen. It seemed that those libraries offer more common books about 
strategic alliances than the libraries of Lund. As mentioned before, to 
write in an objective view and to describe different models of strategic 
alliances many writings from authors in different countries are 
necessary to collect. Finally our thesis includes literatures from 
American, English, Danish, Norwegian, German and Swiss authors. 
The Internet, of course, provided us also with useful literature and 
articles.   
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Through those studies of literature we got a good understanding and 
insight in the complexity of strategic alliances.  
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3 Theoretical Basis 
3.1 Introduction  
During this thesis, we will not focus on the management process itself. 
There are some parts, which slightly touch the management of strategic 
alliances, but basically we want to give a theoretic overview over 
strategic alliances. The main problem in doing this is that the literature 
about strategic alliances does not use common theories or models but 
every author uses his own models and theories to describe strategic 
alliances.  
We decided not to get into the discussion if a merger or a strategic 
alliance makes more sense. The main reason is that strategic alliances 
offer a very broad range of possibilities of getting closer together. It can 
be formed only for a short project or it can be long-termed and 
combined with complete transparency between the involved companies. 
Thus we do not see the fundamental difference from a manager’s point 
of view. Of course there are many legal differences but from a practical 
point of view, there is not much difference if two companies actually 
merge or if they form only a strategic alliance and work together very 
closely. In both cases, the company shares knowledge and resources 
and it is very complicated to terminate the connection. In case of an 
actual merger this may even be a little more complicated, but not very 
much. 
3.2 Definition of Strategic Alliances 
Many definitions have been given for strategic alliances from various 
writers, but all have in common that two or more companies working 
independently together to achieve several kinds of advantages. The fact 
that the partners of strategic alliances are interdependent as well as 
autonomous is named in the literature “paradox of cooperation”.9 
Mockler (1999) hits the bull’s eye with stating that the term ‘strategic 
9 Boettcher, E. (1974), p. 42 
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alliance’ is used to describe a wide range of cooperative partnerships 
and joint ventures.  
The following is a compilation of the most common definitions of 
strategic alliances.  
Webster’s new dictionary and thesaurus defines an alliance as “any 
union for a common purpose”. This definition includes also mergers 
and almost every thing else companies do in everyday-business. Thus 
this definition is too broad to be used in our thesis.  A similar problem 
occurs when using the Definition of Gulati (1995). He defines a 
strategic alliance as “any independently initiated interfirm link that 
involves exchange, sharing, or co-development.“ This one is equivocal. 
It does not get clear, what is meant by “independently”. This could 
mean both the legal independence of companies or that no contact 
occurred between the companies before the alliance. 
Another definition is used by Hitt, Ireland and Hoskisson (1999). Here 
the strategic intend is put in the foreground. “Strategic alliances are a 
primary cooperative strategy, strategy alliances are partnerships 
between whereby their resources, capabilities, and core competencies 
are combined to pursue mutual interest in developing, manufacturing, 
or distributing goods or services”. This one is rather specific. It 
specifies what kind of “abilities” can be combined – for instance it does 
not include an alliance where one partner shares a non-core competency 
which may be very important for the other one. A somehow less 
specified definition is offered by Mohr and Spekman (1994): A 
strategic alliance can be defined as “purposive strategic relationships 
between independent firms that share compatible goals, strive for 
mutual benefits, and acknowledge a high level of mutual dependence”. 
This one is less specified but it demands that the companies 
acknowledge a high level of mutual dependence. For the purpose we 
are pursuing in our thesis this is too narrow because we will also look at 
“loose” alliances based on a single project only. 
In contrast, Spekman, Forbes, Isabella, and MacAvoy (1998) put much 
emphasis on the duration of an alliance: “A strategic alliance is a close, 
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long-term, mutually beneficial agreement between two or more partners 
in which resources, knowledge, and capabilities are shared with the 
objective of enhancing the competitive position of each other”. A 
similar definition was introduced by Parkhe (1991): Strategic alliances 
are “relatively enduring interfirm cooperative arrangements, involving 
flows and linkages that utilize resources and/or governance structures 
from autonomous organizations, for the joint accomplishment of 
individual goals”. But we think that an alliance can also be temporary 
and very short-termed. Child and Faulkner (1998) suggest “in alliances, 
the partner companies join forces in pursuit of common goals without 
loosing their strategic autonomy and without abandoning their own 
specific interests.”. This is unclear at the point of joining forces: Do the 
companies have to work together in combined departments or is it also 
possible that they just exchange some knowledge?  
“A strategic alliance links specific facets of the business of two or more 
firms. At its core, this link is a trading partnership that enhances the 
effectiveness of the competitive strategies of the participating firms by 
providing for the mutually beneficial trade of technologies, skills, or 
products based upon them” (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995). This 
definition is very broad, but it is focussed on the trade of something. 
Elmuti and Kathawala (2001) look at strategic alliances as 
“partnerships of two or more corporations or business units that work 
together to achieve strategically significant objectives that are mutually 
beneficial.” The problem here is that the objectives in our opinion do 
not need to be strategically significant, which narrows the definition too 
much. 
“We call it a strategic alliance when the activities of value adding of at 
least two companies are combined to some kind of competence-
network which is used to maintain and/or to achieve significant 
advantages in competition while the companies pursue compatible 
goals” (Bronder/Pritzl 1991; translated from German in English). This 
is definition is very close to our one and also gave us some ideas for our 
definition. But we want to avoid the phrase “competence-network”, 
which emphasises the exchange of competences and puts the exchange 
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of products, which can be very important in a strategic alliance, into the 
background. 
Yoshino and Rangan (1995) define a strategic alliance as possessing 
simultaneously the following three necessary and sufficient 
characteristics: 
• The two or more firms that unite to pursue a set of agreed upon 
goals remain independent subsequent to the formation of the 
alliance. 
• The partner firms share the benefits of the alliance and control 
over the performance of assigned tasks – perhaps the most 
distinctive characteristic of alliances and the one that makes 
them so difficult to manage. 
• The partner firms contribute on a continuing basis in one or 
more key strategic areas, e.g., technology, products, and so 
forth. 
This definition again is too narrow. For instance one partner could 
contribute knowledge to the alliance only once, while the other partner 
contributes personnel on a continuing basis and both partners share the 
benefits. Following this definition, this example would not be a 
strategic alliance. 
While analysing the different definitions the literature offers, we did not 
find any which describes perfectly what we mean by “strategic 
alliance”. Hence we developed one, we will use during our thesis: 
 ‘Two or more legally independent companies form a strategic alliance 
if they combine their activities of value adding to achieve competitive 
advantages and remain legally independent subsequent to the formation 
of the alliance.”   
 Our definition is one of the broadest out the literature but we do not see 
mergers as strategic alliances. This gives us a good basis for developing 
a differentiated view on the broad range of different types of alliances. 
3.3 Theoretical framework 
To integrate strategic alliances in a broader environment the common 
literature uses a popular model. This model exists in slightly different 
versions. It integrates strategic alliances in a broader environment by 
describing a continuum between market and hierarchy. On the market 
side the purchasing and selling of goods occurs by paying a price. 
There is no need of coordination and the transaction can take place 
short-term. Hierarchy means that the needed goods are produced in the 
company itself. These alternatives are not exclusive. Mixtures between 
both alternatives are possible.  
Mergers and 
aquisitions
Joint
Ownership
Joint 
Venture
Formal 
Collaboration
Info
Coll
Hierarchy
rmal 
aboration
Market
Flexibility
Interdependency, Need for Coordination
 
Exhibit 1: The strategic alliance in the continuum of market and 
hierarchy 
Joint ownerships, joint ventures and formal collaborations can be seen 
as different forms of strategic alliances. These forms are all mixtures 
between market and hierarchy. For the decision in this continuum there 
are three methods to find the best alternative. 
• Comparison between extern prices and intern costs 
• Strategic approach 
18 
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• Transaction costs analysis 
3.3.1 Cost accounting method 
This is a method that compares statically the costs of external 
procurement and the costs of in-house production. The advantages of a 
mixture between the two extremes (strategic alliance) can result from a 
non-linear cost-curve between the extremes. 
Due to several reasons this method is problematic. The decision for or 
against an alternative is based on short-term data for a long-term 
decision. This could lead to a systematic favouritism of the in-house 
production. Then there are problems to acquire the right data for the 
internal and external costs. Internal costs could be manipulated because 
of different interests of some divisions and the external prices could 
intentionally be manipulated until the decision for external 
procurement. 
Power relations, flexibility or dependencies do not count in this 
method.  
3.3.2 Strategic approach 
In the strategic approach non-quantifiable advantages and 
disadvantages are compared. An example could be the following. 
Advantages for the hierarchy side 
• Avoiding of costs by circumventing the market (e.g. 
negotiation costs) 
• Cost advantages due to better coordination 
• Better possibilities of product differentiation 
• Better utilisation ratio and time planning possible 
Disadvantages could be: 
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 Reduction of flexibility 
 No know-how transfer from supplier 
 No benefits of economies of scale 
 Problems with finding the optimal company size 
These are only examples that are controversial. The big problem with 
this approach is that advantages and disadvantages are difficult to 
operationalise. Decisions based on these facts are necessarily made 
from a very subjective view. 
Potential advantages of strategic alliances are obvious. The mixture of 
market and hierarchy could have a better advantage-disadvantage ratio. 
Of course this does not have to be like this.  
3.3.3 Transaction cost analysis10 
The transaction cost theory is based on the work of Coase and 
Williamson. Transaction costs are what Coase named “costs of using 
the price mechanism”.  
The transaction cost theory is based on the idea that different 
organisational forms between market and hierarchy lead to different 
transaction costs. Transaction costs cover the following costs: 
• Initiation costs (e.g. information costs) 
• Negotiation costs 
• Control costs (costs to control delivery quality, delivery time, 
quantity, price and nondisclosure) 
• Adoption costs  
10 Sydow, J. (1992) 
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The minimisation of these costs leads to the decision for an 
organisation form within the continuum between market and hierarchy. 
The optimal form in this approach is only determined through the 
transaction costs.  
To identify transaction costs Williamson uses two personal and two 
situational factors. The first personal factor is that humans only have 
only a bounded rationality11. This means that humans are not able to get 
and use all available information because of bounded cognitive 
abilities. This leads to the problem that it is impossible to deal with 
complex situations in all relevant aspects and eliminates the possibility 
of perfect contracts. 
The second personal factor is that humans act opportunistic. They use 
the chance to enlarge their own welfare.  
The first situational factor is that transactions can be distinguished due 
to complexity and uncertainty. The second situational factor is the 
number of potential transaction partners and the competition between 
them.  
Williamson investigates the relation between these factors to identify 
the transaction costs. Based on this Williamson develops the theory of 
market failure and hierarchy failure.  
In this context the market failure takes place if a transaction partner 
with bounded rationality and high uncertainty and high complexity 
comes together. The problem of opportunistic behaviour becomes 
virulent if the number of potential transaction partners is small. The 
hierarchy failure takes place the other way around. Hierarchy is 
inappropriate if the transaction is certain and not complex. Also a high 
number of potential transaction partners speak for the market.  
11 Williamson, O. (1975 & 1985) 
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For further investigation Williamson enlarges the model with the 
factors information impactness, atmosphere, transaction specific 
investment and frequency of the transactions. A market structure makes 
it more difficult to create an atmosphere of affiance what leads to 
higher transaction costs. The same applies for information impactness 
because asymmetric distributed information encourages opportunistic 
behaviour.  
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Exhibit 2: Forms to minimize transaction costs in denpendency of 
specifity of investment and transaction frequency12 (noch ein bisschen 
übersichtlicher machen) 
 
Exhibit 2 shows the coherence between the specificity and the 
transaction frequency and the optimal form to minimise the transaction 
costs. If the transaction is non-specific the market coordination is 
                                                     
12 Schumann, J., Meyer, U., & Ströbele, W. (1999), p. 459; Williamson, O. 
(1985) 
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recommended. This is understandable if we think of standardised 
goods. The solution for medium specificity of investment is if the 
frequency is low a trilateral coordination and if the frequency is high a 
bilateral coordination. Medium specific are for example customised 
goods. The trilateral coordination has additional a third party which can 
work as mediator. High specific goods with a high transaction 
frequency are predestined for a vertical integration. If the frequency is 
low both the integration and the trilateral coordination should be 
considered. 
Additional even Williamson mentions hybrid organisational forms to 
reduce transaction costs. 
From a transaction cost perspective strategic alliances are some kind of 
quasi externalisation or quasi internalisation depending on the original 
form. The quasi externalisation is recommended if the transaction costs 
in market coordination are lower than the internal costs but still high. 
The quasi internalisation is recommended if internal transaction costs 
are lower than the market transaction costs but still high. Considering 
that the transaction cost approach ignores the exploitation of external 
economics of scale, learning curve advantages and risk shifting the 
following list shows how strategic alliances could reduce transaction 
costs: 
• Long-term agreements to reduce the transaction risks which is 
connected with transaction specific investments 
• Stable and intensive relations with a high transparency to 
reduce searching and negotiation costs 
• Inter-organisational communication technologies 
• Reduction of opportunistic behaviour through dependencies 
• Reduction of quality risks through transparency 
• Through faster inter-organisational learning 
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• Through a better atmosphere 
As result the following potential advantages compared to a market or 
hierarchy solution could be named: 
Compared to the market Compared to hierarchy 
• Lower searching costs 
• Lower negotiating and control 
costs 
• Better information 
• Transfer of non codifiable 
knowledge 
• Less quality control 
• Faster implementation of 
innovations 
• Reduced opportunistic 
behaviour 
• Higher reversibility and 
flexibility 
• Higher sensibility for the 
environment through the 
decentral organised structure 
• Easier adaptation to a 
changing environment 
Exhibit 3:  Potential advantages of strategic alliances compared to market 
and hierarchy solution 
To present a simplified view when the strategic alliance is the better 
alternative the following matrix could be used: 
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Exhibit 4: Strategic alliance in the dimensions of strategic risk and 
competence13 
3.3.4 Results 
The transaction cost approach is not the perfect solution to decide when 
a strategic alliance is adequate. As well as the strategic approach it is 
difficult to operationalise the transaction costs. Also this approach 
ignores some aspects and focuses only on the transaction. The term 
transaction costs in not that clear. Especially the relation to other cost 
types is not explained. Due to this it is not possible to use this approach 
in a pragmatic way. Based on this transaction cost theory no company 
would decide the use of strategic alliances. Therefore this approach is 
only a partial one. We presented a way to describe strategic alliances in 
a broader context and tried to show the theoretical perspective when 
forming strategic alliances. None of these three approaches is able to 
explain the relation of strategic alliances to market and hierarchy 
completely. As a result one can say that the broader theoretical 
framework of strategic alliances is not completely explored and at the 
same time the complexity of this subject gets clearer; even when only 
13 similar to Walker, G. (1988) 
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considering an abstract form of strategic alliances. The complexity will 
even increase, when considering all the different types of possible 
strategic alliances and integrating them into the analysis above. Thus 
the complexity is increasing and one could get the impression that the 
research within this subject is not very advanced or very glaring 
formulated. It is very uncertain if we will ever be able to explain these 
relations in a theoretical way. 
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4 Practical Considerations 
In this part we will give an introduction into some practical topics 
concerning strategic alliances. We will show how and why managers 
form strategic alliances and which factors are very important for their 
success. 
4.1 Evolution of strategic alliances 
Strategic alliances are partnerships of two or more corporations or 
business units that work together closely to achieve strategically 
significant objectives14 like overall competitive advantage as we 
defined earlier. To achieve such a good relationship an evolution 
process takes place, which will be described now. The literature we 
found concerning this aspect is quite coincided. It mostly follows a 
common path starting with the strategic decision followed by the 
configuration of the strategic alliance and the choice of the partner and 
ends with the management of the strategic alliance. With regard to the 
choice of the partner we will analyse in detail the strategic, structural 
and especially the cultural fit. An analysis of the strategic intent is quite 
useful if political and analytical aspects are considered. Therefore we 
decided firstly to focus on these aspects. Secondly a description of the 
evolution process mentioned above will be given.   
4.1.1 Formation of strategic alliances  
When two parties come together both of them will have different 
strategic intents and seek for different benefits from the strategic 
alliance. Thus, these intents must be reconcilable and must be 
sufficiently compatible to leave enough space for cooperation. Hamel 
and Prahalad mention two dimensions.15 The strategic intent envisions a 
desired leadership position and establishes the criteria the organisation 
will use to draw its progress. It also encompasses a very active 
management process, which includes motivating people by 
14 Elmuti, D. and Kathawala, Y. (2001), p.205  
15 Hamel, G. and Prahalad, C.K. (1989), p.64/65 
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communicating the value of target, leaving room for individual and 
team contributions, focusing the organisation’s attention on the essence 
of winning, sustaining enthusiasm by providing new operational 
definitions when circumstances change and using the intent consistently 
to guide resource allocations.  
Clear and realistic intents have to be established by looking at political 
and analytical considerations. This is the initial phase of the formation 
process divided in a strategic match issue and a stakeholder-blessing 
issue according to Lorange and Roos.16  
The strategic match issue deals with the resource input-output 
behaviour, i.e. the extent of resources the parties want to put in the 
strategic alliance and whether generated resources remain in the 
alliance or flow back to the partners, and with the strategic position of 
each partner, i.e. whether he is a leader by focusing on core 
competences or a follower. More questions concerning a common 
strength, benefits for each partner, cultures and so on have to be asked 
to find out if there is a possibility to end in a strategic win-win match 
between the two partners. If this is provided the chance of success in 
implementation will increase.  
The other part of the initial phase deals with the questions whether the 
external and internal stakeholders are pleased with the idea of a 
strategic alliance. A strategic alliance can be seen as a threat among 
internal stakeholders because they could see a decrease of their own 
power and career possibilities within the alliance and a potential to 
loose their jobs. Concepts have to be figured out to understand the 
internal stakeholders’ behaviours and methods better and how to handle 
internal coalitions successfully to give the strategic alliance a good 
chance to succeed. It is also important to convince external stakeholders 
of the importance and the resulting synergies of such a strategic alliance 
because they can stop the existence of the alliance. They have to accept 
and promote the idea of a particular cooperative strategy.  
16 Lorange, P. and Roos, J. (1992), p.30-44  
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Now a deeper step into the intensive phase can be taken. Here it is 
necessary to gather enough information, to do proper analyses and to 
develop a strategic business plan for the strategic alliance. This 
involves that the two prospective partners have to work closely 
together. They have to know where they stand in the market place with 
which degree of market potential and have to identify the key 
competitors. The value chain of Porter shows how combinations of 
activities from the two value chains could create various types of 
synergies and thus strengths. It would go too far here to analyse the 
possible combinations of the two value chains (for example 
downstream or upstream) and to report the synergies out of it. In 
summary the benefits accrue through gaining scale, scope and 
complementarities like access to markets or technologies, sharing risk 
and investments, saving costs and time. Each party should assess how 
these prospective benefits satisfy its own strategic intent. The strategic 
match is the basis for this. It is also essential for both partners to 
understand the competitive advantage of the strategic alliance. 
Competitive strength can be created in the areas of suppliers to create 
bargaining strength, customers to offer a full range of products and to 
maintain a strong sales force, new entrants/exits to create more 
effective entry barriers or lower exit barriers, or new technology to 
combine complementary technologies. By identifying and agreeing on 
those coordinated joint activities that are particular critical to the 
cooperative strategy, an effective business plan can be developed that 
will help the strategic alliance to become competitive.     
The last issue of the intensive phase before a contract is possible to be 
made deals with the internal support. It is the task of the management to 
ensure that the broader range of people within the organisation become 
enthusiastic and feels committed about the venture and is convinced 
that this alliance will bring a higher output and performance to 
anybody. Motivation takes place through detailed information and 
explanation.  
During that intensive phase the partners should not forget to pay 
attention on political considerations. This political aspect will be 
described in the next section and also in chapter 4.6.  
 The four issues mentioned above can be related to different archetypes 
of strategic alliances, which will be described later in the thesis.  
4.1.2 Evolution of strategic alliances  
This section deals with the development of strategic alliances over time. 
The internal and external circumstances will change over the time and 
therefore it is necessary that the strategic alliance, e.g. the management, 
will find a proper adaptation. The following management concept is not 
a recipe for success but a helpful direction sign for the modus operandi 
for management and business units to locate a successful development 
of the strategic alliance. We present here an evolution path of strategic 
alliances based on the overlapping findings of the literature.  
As shown in the figure below there are four steps to analyse: 
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Exhibit 5: Phases of strategic alliances17 
4.1.2.1 Decision for forming a strategic alliance 
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As a first step on the way to a strategic alliance an analysis of the 
company is necessary to get a picture of the in the past followed 
strategies that were used to exploit potentials of utility for building up 
strategic success positions.18 The question here is whether the company 
occupies the core competences that are needed to realize its vision or 
not. In that initial phase the company must check its own situation and 
17 Bronder, C. and Pritzl, R. (1991), p. 46-47, translated from German 
18 Bronder, C. and Pritzl, R. (1992), p.19-30 
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potential of appreciation.19 In that analysis of the company a clear 
strength-and-weakness profile shall be crystallised as well as targets 
and utilities that are expected of the strategic alliance. During this 
survey the environment, the factors of competition and the changing of 
markets have to be considered and evaluated. A check up of the 
potential and applicable human resources is important. There are 
certain methods and analyses for that survey that can be used, e.g. 
analysis of competition, branches, cost structures. These methods will 
help the company to get an overview about potentials and critical areas 
that can be focused on in the near future. It will be then adjudged 
whether an internal solution via the value chain or via the market will 
be focused on. Decisive here is the height of the actual and potential 
transaction costs.  
Unilateralist learning processes will decrease because it is very difficult 
and expensive to have an organic development in a stabile market. It 
also lasts too long. Antitrust laws show a company the limits of 
mergers, and therefore the option of a cooperative transaction via a 
strategic alliance is the best solution. It is less fraught with risk in 
comparison to the other options and it also offers an open option 
concerning the future partnership.    
An analysis of the potential of appreciation will show the company 
alternatives of cooperation. Benchmarks for success like total revenue 
and return on investment are not enough for the appraisal criteria 
because they do not include values like the current market value, the 
development of certain measurements and necessary investments, the 
risks and so on. Anyway, every investor wants to get out a higher 
output than his capital costs have been. A focus on the free cash flow of 
a strategic alternative is a useful appraisal criterion. It has to be checked 
if the resources put in are used most efficiently to higher the value of 
the company. Advantages of time, know-how and costs as well as better 
market accesses and system competence are the focused targets. This 
all has to be pondered against the coordination costs like initiation 
19 Krieger, C. (2001), p.39-42 
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costs, costs of arrangements, control costs and adaptation costs. 
Another criterion is the subjective appraisal of the executives. The 
success of strategic alliances will be further discussed in chapter 4.4. 
It is also important to get enough information about the potential 
markets, potential partners in different countries and general conditions 
by accomplishing market analyses and by collecting information about 
the environmental, technical, political and cultural circumstances. 
4.1.2.2 Configuration  
After coming to a decision about the strategic alliance an analysis in the 
context of the configuration has to be done. The cooperation field, the 
linkage intensity and multiplication possibilities have to be taken into 
consideration.20 Regarding the cooperation field the company has to 
ascertain whether the strategic alliance has to take place in a horizontal, 
vertical or lateral level. This point will be deeply discussed in section 
5.2, so therefore we refer the reader to read about this aspect in the 
mentioned chapter. In general you can say that the company wishes to 
expand its competences in a certain area. These expansions can take 
place in the areas of research and development, marketing and 
distribution, production and logistics, purchasing or disposal and 
recycling all based on Porters value chain. Basically the forces have to 
replenish each other in a way that the company that the strategic 
alliance can achieve essential competitive advantages. For example, 
one partner could hold a good distribution system and the other one the 
necessary product conception. Both partner hope that transaction cost 
advantages occur.  
For determining the linkage intensity the partners have to frame criteria 
concerning the time horizon, the resource allocation and the degree of 
formalization. In the beginning of a strategic alliance the partners have 
to think about how long cooperation shall lasts, e.g. whether the 
strategic alliance aims at a short- or long-term relationship. At this 
every party gets to know very fast the motives, targets and expectations 
20 Bronder, C. and Pritzl, R. (1991), p.45-49  
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of the other one and appearing conflicts can be solved at this early time. 
Every partner has to keep in mind that over the time new aspects and 
areas can appear because of unforeseen synergic effects. A fusion, take 
over, or a break up because of unsolvable conflicts could also happen. 
Furthermore, the strategic alliance is also determined by provided 
resources like human resources and capital. So either each partner of 
the strategic alliance provides a certain amount of resources, which are 
then still in the property of each partner, or the partners accomplish 
their activities together and create therefore an own resource pool. 
Concerning the degree of formalization questions about the 
independent form of organisation, methods- and communication rules, 
a supervisory board and organisational structure will occur. The 
regulation of the formalizing degree is directly dependent on the 
strategic targets, the choice of the “going-to-be-linked” value chain 
activities and on the expected coordination costs.  
In the end multiplication possibilities in the context of the configuration 
will be analysed. A multiplication takes place if cooperation between 
more than two companies exists. This is called a network of companies 
where each company has access to the know how of the whole network 
and therefore can create a new chance for establishing new 
competences.  
4.1.2.3 Choice of the right partner 
One of most important factors for the success of a strategic alliance is 
the right partner. The analysis to find the right partner should be 
stretched across the fundamental, strategic and cultural fit. In general 
we have to say the more partners are involved in the strategic alliance 
the more difficult it will be to reach common goals.  
A fundamental fit exists if the activities and competences that are 
brought into the strategic alliance by each partner complement one 
another. Then there is a big possibility to reach the goals of the value 
chain potentials. A good condition would be a win-win situation where 
each partner gains profits. Therefore the size of the companies playing 
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together is very relevant. If there is disequilibrium in the size of the 
partners one partner could become very dependent on the other one. 
One partner might take advantage of the other one.21 But still, the 
partners have to take into consideration how big the risk is to reach the 
forced targets over the time and how stabile the branch and the 
environment are. The common goals of the alliance have to be 
translated into programmes and then transformed in orders, 
competences and responsibilities for the involved partners, which will 
support the process of reaching the goals.22  
The strategic fit deals with the congruence of the strategic targets of the 
partners.23 The success factors of this congruence are the mutual 
harmony of the business plans, the common determination of 
configuration as well as the same planning horizon. In that context 
there is to say that the partners have to secure their own “black box” so 
that the critical strategic resources that have been put in are still under 
control of each partner. The “black box” secured in the past the position 
of success for each company, so by going into a strategic alliance the 
partners have to divulge their success factors step by step and have to 
expect a return of the other side. That concerns special management 
qualifications, cost leadership factors, core competences and so on. The 
frame of the cooperation is the basis for that. Additionally the direction 
of impact has to be determined by summing up clear managerial 
objectives and expectations. The partners have also to adjust the 
missions of the corporate policy and the strategic programmes in 
consideration of the operative feasibility. The intensity concerning how 
the partners pursuing the business is a success factor for that aspect.  
Last but not least the cultural fit will be now explained. Many strategic 
alliances failed because companies did not pay enough attention to that 
point. Cooperations are cultural “melting points”.24 Corporate culture 
21 Bühner, R. (1993), p.386-388 
22 Bleicher, K. (1992), p.267 et sqq.   
23 Bronder, C. and Pritzl, R. (1992), p.36 et sqq.  
24 Bleicher, K. (1992), p.284 
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emerges through a specific behaviour of the people involved. 
Incompatibilities will show up if different nationalities from different 
cultures meet.25 A good communication is a success factor to solve 
cultural differences. It is important that one partner shows the 
willingness to accept the local culture as well as the different corporate 
culture of the other one. It should be the target of the companies to 
develop a cultural fit through a system of common values, stiles and 
cultures in consideration of national aspects. A cultural analysis brings 
clearness into this and a cultural profile would show the differences 
between them. Personal aspects will influence positively the cultural 
aspect. Certain managers or leaders can be put into the strategic alliance 
or also into the alliance partner. Therefore they have to be competent 
and unbiased. To motivate those managers certain plans about their 
carriers and payments should exist. These managers will form the 
cultural field of the alliance. When the different cultures meet there can 
be the following reactions:  
• Cultural pluralisms if the cultures exist side by side. 
• Cultural assimilations if there is a slow fusion of cultures. 
Thereby positive elements of the original culture can fusion to 
a new uniform and combined culture. 
• Cultural overtaking if one company tries to transfer its culture 
to the partner. That partner will then loose to a certain degree 
his independence.  
• Cultural resistance where it comes in an extreme case to a 
break-up of the strategic alliance  
There are several starting points for the development of cultures in the 
cooperation field: organization of interfaces, the inner structure, models 
of partnership, management systems with certain motivation and 
25 Krieger, C., (2001), p.49-53 
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personal systems like the rotation of employees, the promotion of 
identification through for example having ceremonies or excursions. 
4.1.2.4 Management of the strategic alliance 
The last phase in the evolution process of strategic alliances deals with 
the management of strategic alliances. The management needs the 
understanding of the continuously-changing environment as well as of 
the permanent process of negotiations. The companies and hence the 
strategic alliances have to be adapted to the permanently changing 
conditions. It is up to the management whether the strategic alliance 
keeps existing or not. After defining the common goals it has to be 
clear who has which responsibilities and who is for what the contact 
person.26 In this connexion there is the problem of loosing a part of 
independence. Every partner has to share the resources with the other 
one. So there is the danger of opportunistic behaviour. One partner may 
exploit the knowledge of the other one. But anyway, this will lead to 
certain dependence. New resources and competence will arise, which 
have to be shared. The partners have therefore to keep in mind on 
which motives and common goals they are aiming. Contract 
negotiations are necessary to come to an adequate formal structure of 
form, contract and coordination. Therefore competitive conditions have 
to be considered also. It would be clever of the management to create 
conditions in form of contracts and conceptions to secure the continuity 
of the strategic alliance and where it is hard to dissolve the venture. 
Efficiency is provided if the management of the alliance can resort to 
competences for the implementation of its decisions.27  
Further, managers occupy the instance of coordination. The whole 
success is dependent on coordinating and integrating the resources of 
the participating firms. On the one hand there is the task-oriented 
management, which is concentrating on the systematic planning and 
realisation of the strategic alliance and on the other hand there is the 
interaction-oriented management, which aims at interpersonal relations 
26 Bronder, C. and Pritzl, R. (1991), p.51-53 
27 Bircher, B. (1990), p.27 et sqq.  
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of the managers and involved persons. You can say that strategic 
alliances have also a kind of life cycle: in the beginning there is 
confidence and euphoria but after a contract is made conflicts 
concerning the interaction-oriented and task-oriented management will 
appear. But those conflicts are not necessarily negative – for instance 
they also increase the productivity. Such discrepancies should be 
eliminated on an early stage and therefore an active crises- and 
consensus management is a useful tool for an early detection of 
problems and negotiation of conflicts. Also the existence of cultural 
differences show the central role of the management in the alliance as 
we have seen in the past negotiations between Japanese and western 
firms.  
In a later stage a fusion become reasonable. Core competences have to 
be constantly checked as well as the changing of legal and political 
basic conditions because the latter puts a high pressure on the structure 
of the strategic alliance. That aspect will be further discussed in chapter 
4.6. How the relation of cooperation will finally develop is dependent 
on many external and internal factors such as trust as well as on the 
interest for innovations, changing and handling of conflicts.28  
4.1.2.5 An alternative perception of the evolution process 
According to the authors Lorange and Roos an alliance is a shared 
strategic alliance between partners having an active role.29 There are 
three stages in the evolution of a strategic alliance: 
1. One partner provides technology; the other one is contributing 
market- and customer access. Over the time one partner 
becomes dominant in executing the strategic alliance’s task. 
This will lead to a creation of a specific market force where the 
other parent is less active.  
28 Bronder, C. (1993/1), p.107 et sqq.  
29 Lorange, P. and Roos, J. (1992), p.79-93 
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2. The evolution process of strategic alliances may also starts 
here: While the joint venture’s organization takes over more 
and more of the value-creating functions, one partner becomes 
dominant as mentioned before and the other one more passive. 
This can be slowed down or prevented if both partners wish to 
remain active. Therefore a very stressful coordination is 
necessary as well as transferring more and more functions to 
the strategic alliance.  
3. The strategic alliance is seen as a fully autonomous 
independent entity. If a core role is intended, the nature of 
technology involved can be the key for evolution. Some 
problems might occur, if the technology, which has to be 
shared, is unique. In that case the partner controlling it might 
have provisos to sharing the technology. Normally the partner 
controlling the technology is willing to let the alliance absorb 
it. Over the time the shared or dominant strategic alliance is 
accepted or it will be dissolved. The life cycle will be also 
aborted if a partner is not willing to let the strategic alliance 
establish its own market contacts. 
Now there are three possibilities:  
1. The strategic alliance continues like that if it remains 
competitive. 
2. The strategic alliance will be aborted because of no competitive 
success and not achieving the necessary return to its partners. 
3. The strategic alliance will be terminated because one of the 
partners is buying out the other one. 
This model will be applied more detailed later on in chapter 5.3. 
4.2 Motives for Strategic Alliances  
There is a broad range of possible motives for entering a strategic 
alliance. There are several different kinds of motives. Some of them, 
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like the reduction of costs, are purely financial. Another group are the 
motives to reduce the company’s risk. One very big group are strategic 
motives. Some elements of that group are the access to new markets, 
the access to new technologies and knowledge, and synergies. In a 
strategic alliance the partners do not necessarily have the same motives 
for their alliance with each other. Partners might even have different 
motives to enter a particular alliance. As an example, one partner may 
want to get access to technologies, which the other one possesses, while 
the other partner wants to get access to a new market. Another very 
common combination is that one partner wants to get access to a 
market, while the other one wants to leave this particular market. The 
common literature points out the following motives. 
4.2.1 Access to the Market 
When a company wants to enter a foreign market, it generally has three 
different options: acquisition of an existing business, internal start-up, 
and strategic alliances. 
The acquisition is the most popular tool to enter foreign markets. It 
offers direct market access and helps the company to overcome the 
entry barriers like costs of entry, legal barriers, missing reputation in 
the new market, and so forth. But on the other hand it contains also 
several disadvantages. The first is the problem of finding an adequate 
partner to acquire who has the knowledge and market access the 
company needs but who is not too expensive to acquire. A big dilemma 
a company faces is whether to pay a premium price for a successful 
company or to buy a struggling company at a bargain price. This 
approach also holds a big risk in case of failure. When the company is 
unable to compete successfully in the new market, it is very 
complicated to leave the market again. Overall the approach of 
acquiring a company offers the opportunity of fast access to the new 
market and holds the risk of getting stuck with an unwanted business 
part which cannot be sold at a good price anymore. 
Another way of accessing new markets is an internal start-up. Using 
this approach, a company starts building up a new “internal” company, 
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which tries to build up the capabilities needed to compete successfully 
in the new market. This approach needs much time and thus is not used 
very often. A company using this approach also has to overcome the 
new market’s entry barriers, which can be very expensive or even 
impossible. But this approach can be very promising when the company 
has already most or all of the skills it needs to compete effectively in-
house. This effect is enforced when the targeted industry is populated 
with many relatively small firms so the new start-up does not have to 
compete head-to-head against larger, more powerful rivals. Thus there 
are some seldom situations in which the internal start-up approach is 
superior. Between these two approaches lies the strategic alliance. They 
can be used in basically three different situations. First, a strategic 
alliance is a good way to pursue an opportunity that is too complex, 
uneconomical, or risky for a single organization to pursue alone. 
Second, strategic alliances make sense, when the opportunities in a new 
industry require a broader range of competencies and know-how than 
any one organization can marshal. These two ways can be used to 
spread the risk of the entry and therefore make it less expensive to enter 
the market. Third, strategic alliances are sometimes the only way to 
gain entry into a desirable market. In that case, a local partner is 
selected that provides the company with access to his home market. 
Thus strategic alliances can offer new knowledge and direct access to a 
market but they remain more flexible than an acquisition and are built 
faster than an internal start-up. A big drawback is that the partner also 
profits from the alliance. Hence the company has to consider carefully 
which knowledge should be shared and which should not. 
4.2.2 Personal Contacts 
The economy offers many different partners. Hence the choice of the 
best partner is very complicated and normally the searching company 
faces a lack of information when trying to decide for a particular 
partner. Personal contacts are often a driving force for strategic 
alliances because mutual trust can help to overcome, or at least oversee, 
the lack of information. Many managers also believe that mutual trust 
lowers the risk of opportunistic behaviour. Normally this motive is not 
sufficient. It only helps when other motives are already present.  
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4.2.3 Access to new technologies and knowledge 
the partner possesses 
In today’s fast moving markets, the access to the cutting edge 
technologies is a very important advantage in competition. By having 
access to the partner’s newest technologies and knowledge, the 
company can improve its own position and it is easier to close gaps in 
its knowledge base. A good example for technology exchange is the 
project “Jessi”30 during which the Europeans tried to get an edge over 
the Japanese and the Americans in the field of producing microcircuits. 
4.2.4 Advantages in Time 
In view of the changing competition moving towards a competition 
based on time, the achievement of time advantages is becoming more 
and more important in reaching a competitive advantage. This kind of 
competition is very often also called “innovative competition”. The 
product life cycles are becoming shorter and very often the 
development of a product takes longer than it actually is sold on the 
market. Especially in the technology- and research-intensive industries 
like the aerospace industry, electronic devices and in the automotive 
industry the timely introduction of a product and the immediate global 
availability are crucial factors for a product’s success. The combination 
of the partner’s resources in a strategic alliance may for instance in the 
area of research and development shorten both the development cycles 
and the reaction time upon unexpected changes in the market. 
30 “Jessi“ is an acronym for “Joint European Submicron Silicon Initiative” and 
was founded by the EU. During this research project, the basics for the 
European microchips at the end of the millennium should have been 
developed. The project was started in 1989. The goal was to break the 
Japanese dominance in the field of memory-chips. Half of the costs of the 
project were paid by the industry, while the other half was paid by the EU and 
the involved countries. 
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4.2.5 Reduction of Costs 
This is a very important motive when seeking for a strategic alliance. 
There are two distinct ways of saving costs: By implementing 
transparency and by combining the production. 
The implementation of transparency aims at the elimination of “waste” 
which occurs at the interface between the partners. The literature 
identifies different types of waste: 
• Depending decision cycles 
• Push-pull conflict 
• Complex interface with external entities and suppliers 
• Bottleneck function and inappropriate capacity planning 
• Lack of standard work practice and document control 
• Existence of fast-track/expedite path for strategically important 
products 
• Myopic corporate prioritization procedure 
• Existing computer applications are ‘stovepipes’ 
• Fragmented file stores 
It can easily be seen that the elimination of these types of waste offers 
big opportunities to make the value chain more efficient. 
On the other hand there are mainly two different ways to combine the 
production. Even with separated production sites the partners can cut 
costs by combining the production assignments or by specialization 
onto special products. In this way, the partners can achieve economies 
of scale. The agreement to act like that can be concluded for both 
components and final products. The other way to cut costs is to build a 
 43 
collective production site. The effects mentioned for different 
production sites are applicable here too and many of them are even 
bigger. Additionally there are several other cost cutting effects like a 
smaller stock. The drawbacks of the second approach are obviously 
high costs for building the combined production site and the strong 
bindings between the partners. As soon as a combined production site is 
built the partners face a lack of flexibility and the strategic alliance is 
very hard to end. 
4.2.6 Reduction of Risk 
Today’s products often require big investments into research and 
development. This is connected to many different risks. For instance 
the research might fail in finding new ideas and innovations for new 
products or the customers may not show enough interest in buying the 
new developed product. Sharing knowledge about the research and the 
market between the partners can reduce these insecurities. In this way 
the technological and market knowledge can be broadened and the 
forecasts become more reliable for both parties. Additionally the risk 
can be shared by simply sharing the costs for the developments between 
the companies. Thus a miscarriage is less expensive for each of the 
partners. 
4.2.7 Synergies 
This effect often goes hand in hand with other ones and is rather hard to 
distinguish from these. Synergies arise when two or more companies 
are able to reach a goal better than a single company. A good example 
for this is the combination of complementary knowledge of both 
companies. In this way, new knowledge and technologies can be 
developed whereas each company on its own would not have been able 
to reach this. These synergies often arise when former separated 
technologies are growing together as it can be seen in the 
telecommunication- and computer-industry. These technologies were 
almost unconnected in the past and are growing together very fast now. 
Thus strategic alliances can be witnessed very often between companies 
of the computer industry and the telecommunications industry. 
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4.2.8 Manipulation of the Competition 
According to Porter, five forces are affecting a company: suppliers or 
raw materials, parts, components or other resource inputs, buyers, firms 
in other industries offering substitutes products, potential new entrants, 
and rivalry among competing sellers. A strategic alliance has the 
potential to change every one of these five forces: 
4.2.8.1 Suppliers of raw materials 
Often companies in a strategic alliance bundle their needs for inputs 
and hence gain bargaining power. Thus they can try to force suppliers 
to lower their prices, to raise their quality, or to use special production 
technologies.  
The partners can also use their bargaining power to force their suppliers 
to discriminate rivals. 
4.2.8.2 Buyers 
Again the companies gain bargaining power. They have more power to 
charge higher prices or to invent new standards. 
4.2.8.3 Firms in other industries offering substitutes 
Here the advantages of a strategic alliance are rather small. But the 
companies can still try their additional power to change their own 
market in a way that the substitutes cannot be used as substitutes 
anymore. This is a very risky strategy because it contains the risk of 
loosing the home market completely to substitutes. 
4.2.8.4 Potential new entrants 
The companies in the alliance can try to pursue the government to 
implement new entry barriers like higher quality requirements, security 
standards or to grant a temporary monopoly. They can also use their 
market power to frighten new entrants for instance by promising to 
enter a price competition with every new entrant and to underbid every 
price the new entrant might offer. If this threat is believable possible 
new entrants will think twice before entering the market. 
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On the other hand a strategic alliance can also be used to help partners 
getting access to a market. 
4.2.8.5 Rivalry among competing sellers 
There are several ways of reducing the pressure of the competition. The 
easiest one consists out of cartel-like arrangements between the 
partners. More indirect ways affect the rivals. The partners can for 
instance try develop and use their own standards to make existence 
harder for competitors. They might even try to pursue the government 
to prescribe certain technology standards. They can also try to initiate 
price wars to fight rivals out of the market. By using these instruments, 
the parties have to consider legal barriers, which set limits for cartel-
like actions. W. Kartte, the former president of the German federal 
cartel office, suspected that strategic alliances are nothing else than the 
attempt of global acting companies to form their own system of 
competition and to avoid competition by according arrangements and 
market partitioning31. 
Concluding there are many different possibilities in forming and 
changing the competition by forming a strategic alliance. Strategic 
alliances pursuing such goals always risk violating legal restrictions. 
4.2.9 Leaving the Market 
Strategic alliances can also be used to leave a market in the long run. 
When a market does not offer any possibilities for success, there is the 
option of leaving it. But when leaving a market, there can be significant 
barriers, which make it more complicated or even impossible to leave 
the market. These barriers can be manifold. First there are cost 
disadvantages consisting mainly out of losses when selling production 
sites and materials, compensation for employees, and contractual 
penalties. Second there are negative implications on the reputation of 
customers, suppliers and capital providers. 
31 Dressel, L. (1991), p 394 
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When there are very high barriers, the immediate exit out of the market 
can be too expensive. In that case, a strategic alliance can be a solution, 
if the partner is interested in overtaking and carrying on the business. 
By doing so, the personal can be transferred to the partner and the 
takeover will be more smoothly. Expensive social plans and “sunk 
costs” are also avoided. However factual there is not much difference to 
simply selling the business. 
4.3 Risks and Problems facing strategic 
alliances 
The trend towards strategic alliances has not brought the big benefits, 
the supporters of strategic alliances promised. Many studies focus only 
on the success-factors for strategic alliances without mentioning the 
risks. But it is the risks that have to be well known because they are the 
true reason why more than 60% of all strategic alliances fail in reaching 
their goals. 
4.3.1 Clash of cultures and “incompatible personal 
chemistry” 
Cultural clash is probably one of the biggest problems that corporations 
in alliances face today. “These cultural problems, consisting of 
language, egos, chauvinism, and different attitudes to business, can all 
make the going rough. Problems can be particularly acute between a 
publicly quoted Western holding company, keenly focused on share 
holder’s value, and Japanese partners who have different priorities”32. 
The first thing that can cause problems is the language barrier that they 
might face. It is most viable for partners who want to work together that 
they understand each other very well to avoid misunderstandings. If 
they are unable to communicate perfectly, the strategic alliance failed 
before it even began. After a good communication is established, the 
companies face other cultural problems. Different cultures operate in 
different ways “for example, US companies tend to evaluate 
32Killburn, D. (1999), p. 22 
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performance on the basis of profit, market share, and specific financial 
benefits. Japanese companies tend to evaluate primarily on how an 
operation helps build its strategic position, particularly by improving its 
skills”33. Thus the cultural differences directly influence the choice of 
the partner and the way the alliance actually works. 
4.3.2 Lack of trust 
Risk sharing is one of the primary bonding tools in a partnership. What 
will happen if one company is successful and the other experiences a 
failure? The partners have to generate a sense of commitment between 
the partners to avoid situations in which one partner is pointing the 
failure finger at the other one. Blaming each other for the failure does 
not solve the problem, but increases tension and mistrust between the 
partners. Also technologies and knowledge are not shared very 
effectively if there is a lack of trust between the partners. Thus building 
mutual trust is one of the most important, but also one of the most 
challenging tasks during a strategic alliance. This mutual trust has to be 
built between individuals. Not companies trust each other, people do. 
Therefore, alliances need to be formed to enhance trust between 
individuals. The companies must form the three forms of trust, which 
include responsibility, equality, and reliability. Very many promising 
strategic alliances failed because of the lack of mutual trust causing 
unsolved problems, lack of understanding, and despondent 
relationships. 
4.3.3 Wrong reasons for forming the alliance and 
lack of clear goals and objectives 
In today’s business world, many strategic alliances are formed for the 
wrong reasons. Alliances formed like that will surely lead into a 
disaster in the future. For instance many companies enter a strategic 
alliance to combat industry competitors. As long as there are no well-
defined clear goals how the alliance can lead to a competitive 
advantage, this action is counterproductive. The involved companies 
33Daniels, D.J. and Radebaugh, L.H. (2001) 
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raise flag and move into the spotlight, showing that they have a 
weakness they want to abandon but do not know how to do that. 
Alliances are also very often formed to correct internal company 
problems because the management thinks of this action as a quick fix. 
But in reality it is just the other way round: First the internal problems 
have to be solved and then the challenging task of making a strategic 
alliance work can be taken over. In fact, the company might already be 
doomed and is just taking another one along for the ride.  
A problem very close to these ones is the lack of clear goals and 
objectives. As long as these are not well specified there is the risk of 
dissimilar objectives and goals. Over time this will lead to the inability 
to share risks and a lack of trust. 
4.3.4 Lack of coordination between management 
teams 
In strategic alliances it is likely to happen that not all managers possess 
all the knowledge about the legal restrictions bound to the alliance. And 
this lack of knowledge can lead to an unintentional abuse of the 
information shared while being a strategic alliance. Such mistakes will 
surely terminate the alliance and would most likely end up in a legal 
battle, which could take years to solve, if it can be settled at all, and 
could result in big losses of shareholder value. 
4.3.5 Differences in operating procedures and 
attitudes among partners 
Other problems that can occur are different attitudes among the 
companies. These problems can be very manifold. The one company 
delivers its goods or services a little behind schedule, the other one does 
not always stick to its quality guidelines, etc. These problems may lead 
to distrust among the companies and usually make the employees at the 
other company angry. Sometimes this can also lead to a hostile 
takeover. An example of this is described below: “The deal between 
Publicis Communication and Foote, Cone and Belding (FCB) was 
designed to fill strategic needs of each: An alliance in Europe would 
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finally give FCB the international reach it needed, while Publicis could 
use FCB’s experience in North an South America to serve its 
multinational clients. The venture officially ended earlier, after bitter 
and expensive divorce proceedings. True North Communications Inc., 
the holding company for Foote Cone, and the world’s No. 8 agency 
group, is fighting off a 28-a-share hostile takeover attempt by its ex-
partner Publicis, which still owns 18.5 percent.”34  
4.3.6 Relational Risk 
Relational risk is concerned with the probability that the partner firms 
lack commitment and that their possible opportunistic behaviour could 
undermine the prospects of an alliance. This is a typical “prisoner’s 
dilemma”. This is a theoretical situation from the game theory. In such 
a situation both partners have the possibility to betray the other partner. 
Thus both partners have two possibilities of action: First to cooperate 
and second to defect, which is betraying. In practice this situation, in 
which it is favourable for each partner to betray the other one, often 
leads to a lack of mutual trust between the partners. Consequently this 
can also lead to problems in sharing knowledge or technology. An 
example of this dilemma is shown in exhibit 5. 
  Actor A 
  cooperate defect 
cooperate (3,3) (0,5) 
Actor B 
defect (5,0) (1,1) 
Exhibit 6: Prisoner's dilemma 
                                                     
34 Melcher,R. and Edmundson, G. (1997) 
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No matter, what Actor B does, it is always better for Actor A to defect, 
which means that he acts opportunistic: If both actors cooperate, they 
both gain three “points”. But this situation is not optimal for A. He gets 
more profit if he defects. The same applies when B defects. In the case 
that A cooperated, he does not get any profit, while he would get 1 
“point” if he defected. Since this is a symmetrical situation, B will 
show the same behaviour, which leads to a “Nash-Equilibrium”35 in 
which both actors defect.  
But in this equilibrium, the actors do not reach the most beneficial 
situation, which would be that both cooperate. But this equilibrium will 
be reached when there is only one round to play. If the game is played 
for more than one round, there are two possibilities: a limited number 
of rounds and an unlimited number of rounds. In the former case, both 
players will defect in the last round, because there is no reason left to 
cooperate. But if both players know that both will defect in the last 
round, they will also defect in the round before, and so on. Hence there 
will be no cooperation at all as long as there are a limited number of 
rounds. In the latter situation of unlimited rounds, there is always 
enough time left to punish the counterpart and mutual cooperation is 
possible.  
In practice, many situations can be found, where the number of rounds 
seems to be limited, but both partners cooperate. There are several 
reasons for that kind of behaviour:36 
• The existence of irrational reasons to trust the partner based on 
intuitional appraisement of the partner 
• Moral concerns that defecting could be seen as amounted 
35“If there is a set of strategies with the property that no player can benefit by 
changing her strategy while the other players keep their strategies unchanged, 
then that set of strategies and the corresponding payoffs constitute the Nash 
Equilibrium.”  
36 Thielen, T. (1997) 
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• The payoff-matrix is wrong 
• Other reasons to cooperate, like future contacts to the partner. 
However there are many examples, which show that partner firms are 
very often more committed to their own goals than to the shared goals 
of the alliance. In the case of a conflict of goals most partners decide 
for their own goals and abandon the alliance or – even worse – try to 
take advantage out of it. Such opportunistic behaviours include 
shirking, appropriating the partner’s resources, distorting information, 
harbouring hidden agendas, and delivering unsatisfactory products and 
services.37  
To avoid the problem of being deceived, the literature offers two 
different solutions: Effective control mechanisms or another incentive 
structure.38 The first approach aims at detecting the defecting and offers 
the possibility of an adequate reaction. The latter one aims at avoiding 
the defecting and making it unattractive. This can be reached for 
instance by contractual punishments. 
Because of the serious risks linked to relational risk, it is one of the 
most important risks to consider when entering a strategic alliance. 
4.3.7 Performance risk 
Performance risk is the probability that an alliance may fail even when 
partner firms commit themselves fully to the alliance. Das and Teng 
(1999) published a study showing that performance risk includes 
environmental factors, such as government policy changes, war, and 
economic recession, market factors, such as fierce competition and 
demand fluctuations, and internal factors, such as a lack of competence 
in critical areas, or sheer bad luck. 
37 Das, T.K. and Teng, B.S., (1999) 
38Gahl, A. (1991) 
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4.3.8 Strategic alliances might create a future local 
or even global competitor 
A strategic alliance always holds the risk that a strong competitor is 
created. When the companies exchange knowledge, skills and 
technologies, there is always the risk that one company can deal better 
with the new skills and grows to a strong competitor. A company has 
several different ways of limiting this risk. First it can decline to 
cooperate with others in the field of its core competency or main 
business. But this behaviour has also the disadvantage that the main 
business cannot benefit from any strategic alliance. The second 
possibility are contractual clauses that constrain future actions of the 
partner so that he cannot enter specified regions or industries. 
The following case shows the problems and risks associated with global 
alliances: 
The dangers of global alliances are evident in the case study of 
Anamartic, a UK semiconductor firm with a novel technology. 
Anamartic undertook a strategy of global alliance with a major foreign 
customer and supplier-manufacturer in order to access resources an 
achieve flexibility. Instead, the new venture found itself locked into a 
trajectory shaped by the needs of powerful corporate partners. The 
Japanese partner acquired technological competence and effective 
control over the intellectual property of the venture. The coupling from 
research and development and from production can create serous 
difficulties for the protection of intellectual property and the realization 
of its potential value.39  
4.4 Key Success factors of strategic alliances 
As mentioned below in chapter 4.5, success can be measured by many 
magnitudes and dimensions like profitability, return of investments, 
stability of the total operating performance and so on. But this is not 
enough. Environmental, inner-organizational, cultural and human 
39Garnsey , E. and Wilkinson, M. (1994), p. 138 
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factors also influence the success of a strategic alliance in a enormous 
magnitude. If organizational arrangements of assimilations stay away or 
when transactions do not have a clear concept in the corporate policy, 
strategic alliances will show a low quote of feasibility. There exists 
always a nearly endless potential of conflicts – this has to be kept in 
mind all the time. As mentioned earlier in this thesis it is very difficult 
to assign a certain ratio of success to a partner. Therefore a certain 
distribution key has to be assessed.40 As we have seen many strategic 
alliances failed in the past because of reasons the involved people did 
not think about. Thus there exist many key factors for the success of 
strategic alliances. The following shall give the reader an overview 
about the success factors starting with common factors and ending in 
more deeply ones.  
As mentioned before, cultural conflicts may occur, which is a result of 
different company- and national cultures. To avoid those there has to be 
an open communication of all participants.41  
An interchange of ideas will help to dovetail strategies, goals and 
procedures if conflicts occur. The companies should appoint employees 
who have the right instinct and experience to avoid misunderstandings.   
Human aspects like motivation and clear future outlooks are also 
playing an important role. The rotation of in-house employees through 
the strategic alliance as well as the exploitation of cross-training 
opportunities are an efficient training tool and guarantee a permanent 
knowledge transfer. Information symmetries lower the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour. A common strategy and a realistic appraisal of 
the achievable synergies is a basis for that. Clear objectives and targets 
have to been worked out together that ambiguities will not emerge. It 
has to be assessed which competence-areas shall work together and 
which division will be involved.  
40 Bronder, C. (1993), p.107 et sqq.  
41 Krieger, C. (2001), p.70-73; Garai, G., (2001), p.601-605; Gumprecht, I. and 
Sjöholm, P. (1992)  
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Because of having a lack of control concerning the effort each partner 
puts in the strategic alliance, a situation of mistrust could emerge. 
Taking a long-term view of the alliance encourages a highly 
collaborative and trusting relationship early on, which is a precursor to 
a successful corporate marriage. The partners should assure a balanced 
amount of shared values if their initiatives are to succeed. So an 
equilibrium can be obtained if the distribution systems, the degrees of 
technology and the information networks concerning the sourcing and 
evaluation are as possible similar. It will be helpful to have one person 
as a contact address to avoid a wrong flow of information.  
Reciprocative control helps on one hand to achieve common goals 
because an agreement of the partner is always necessary but on the 
other side it will lame the courses of business if the partners have 
unequal opinions.  
In addition, many theoreticians and practitioners suggest a time-
intensive search for the right partner, compatibility of the corporate 
culture and corporate policy, balanced ratio of costs and utility, control 
of the flow of information or the like to lower the potential of conflicts- 
but in reality there are still many more. So an alliance should allow 
continual change and should be structured with room for 
experimentation and pullbacks due to adverse marketplace changes. 
They also refer to a permanent analysis of alternatives concerning the 
strategies a company is focusing on, the type of the strategic alliance 
and the partner to complement one another.  Therefore a company has 
to undertake market analysis as well as an appraisement of the 
competition-situation. Each company has to know its market shares in a 
specific area not to underestimate the rivalry. Bleeke and Ernst showed 
in their study of 150 companies from different continents that only 8 
percent of the strategic alliances worked out where the geographical 
market was the common factor.42  
42 Bleeke, J. and Ernst, E. (1991), p.128 
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Defining and documenting clear objectives, performance benchmarks, 
and timetables for key milestones will bring forward the strategic 
alliance. Especially the documentation should be done with care: if 
important commitments of technology, equity and personnel are 
involved, there will be a call for extremely comprehensive written 
contracts that protect everybody. For instance, capital requirements, 
ownership parameters, employee incentive issues, access to future 
technology developments and a range of other considerations should be 
covered.  
But mostly the management influences the success of strategic 
alliances.43 The senior management has to formulate, implement, 
manage and monitor with its full commitment the company’s overall 
strategic plans. Their impact as a leader is very important for the 
success of the strategic alliance. They have to make sure that the 
alliance receives all necessary resources and have to convince others 
throughout the organization of the importance of the alliance. “Good 
partnerships, like good marriages, do not work on the basis of 
ownership and control. It takes effort and commitment and enthusiasm 
from both sides if either is to realize the hoped-for benefits.”44 
Partnerships of companies whose management philosophies, strategies 
and ideas are most similar will, of course, bring a higher survival-
possibility than those, which have different views. The management has 
to be effective and strong, but they have to start with simple alliances 
and then have move to more complex ones. Therefore they must create 
an environment of trust. A development of relationship-networks is 
maybe a useful beginning. As said earlier, the goals have to be well 
defined and somehow measurable, for instance by measuring the 
market share. In order to succeed, the alliance must be always assessed 
and evaluated against short-term and long-term objectives. Independent 
of the relationship of the partners and of the merging of separate 
corporate cultures, the management has to make sure that alliances are 
aligned with the company’s strategy. Clearly defined and shared goals 
43 Elmuti, D. and Kathawala, Y. (2001), p.209-215 
44 Ohmae, K., (1992), p.483 
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and objectives should be the result out of it. But synergies only result 
over the time. To avoid a climate of disappointment the management 
should not overestimate the desired synergies and should show a big 
engagement that all employees will feel the success. There has to be a 
clear link between the industry’s future and the fit of the alliance into 
that plan where every partner clearly understands his role. A McKinsey 
study found that 50 percent of alliance failures are due to poor strategy 
while 50 percent are the result of poor management.45 The planning, 
commitment, and agreement are essential to the success of any 
relationship, but to learn about the planning steps towards an overall 
strategy we want to refer the reader to chapter 4.1.2 (The evolution of 
strategic alliances). It is also quite necessary for companies to compete 
on the growing international market – so cooperating on a global level 
and building up international relationships will facilitate the process of 
global competition.   
The ability of cooperation is influenced by many factors: it will 
increase through a trust-aiding behaviour as said before, through a 
decentralised form of organization and by appropriate management 
systems.46  
Trust is the recipe to achieve reciprocative advantages. Therefore the 
employees have to be motivated. They have to realize that a strategic 
alliance in comparison to an acquisition or going alone makes it 
possible that the own company or some departments risk a step forward 
beyond internal boarders to achieve new spheres and stay competitive. 
Because a strategic alliance is not a static entity, it is a consecutive 
process of negotiations. The motto is “learning through conflict and 
consensus”. To deal with the reciprocative approach, values like 
patience and calmness are necessary to have.  
The leading- and organizational structure has to be adapted to the 
different mentalities. Bureaucratic structures and systems hamstring the 
45 Alliance Management, 14th April 1999 
46 Bronder, C., (1993/2), p.20-27  
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handling of conflicts as well as the handling of learning behaviour of 
the employees. In a decentralized organizational structure the 
employees have creativity- and innovation-aiding climate, in which 
they can act independently. If there is a good communication structure 
a quick exchange with the leadership will be possible. Also the chosen 
legal form of the alliance as well as the organizational form influences 
the flexibility of a strategic alliance. Limited liability companies are 
characterized by a high autonomy of the leadership and a better 
handling of the shares in the business. Beside the legal form the degree 
of integration influences the breadth of cooperation abilities. 
Concerning the conjunction of divisions is a holding therefore better 
than a matrix structure.   
The factor of appropriate management systems deals with controlling-, 
personal-, and incentive systems. If those systems are built flexible 
enough, a cooperation between the divisions will be accelerated and 
increase the success of cooperation. How intense the conjunction of the 
different management systems shall be is dependent on desired size of 
autonomy of the cooperation. Controlling systems provide the alliance 
with necessary information to formulate strategic programmes and also 
with measures to control the implementation.  
On the other hand controlling systems constitute formal communication 
networks of the organizational entity. The dimensions of configuration 
have to be clear, i.e. the management has to take into consideration the 
reference towards the object and time, function and form of 
institutionalisation. It is to clarify which flows of resources shall be 
detected, on which time horizon shall be focused on (the longer the 
more abstract the information), which techniques shall be used for 
information processing and type of transfer and on which management 
level shall the controlling system be installed. Strategic and operatic 
goals have to be well defined in the sense of milestones for the 
development of the cooperation. The deviation between certain 
measurements shall be transparent to formulate hypothesis about the 
reason of appearance. Personal systems help to select employees under 
cooperation-specific requirements to finally increase the ability of 
cooperation. Traditional values and experiences of old-established 
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executives guarantee the transfer of competences into the strategic 
alliance. The managers have to ensure the learning through conflict and 
consensus, the change for innovation, have to negotiate with values like 
sensibility, patience, curiosity, humility and risk-willingness, and have 
to occupy inter-cultural competence. A certain amount of power inside 
their companies is necessary to implement changes quickly and 
effective. Clear career planning and further training are essential 
because managers should have future visions and have to know that 
their jobs are secured in any case. The goal of the personal development 
is that the employees are able to manage future tasks and that they are 
up to all requirements. The involved persons have to be well prepared 
in meeting new and changing business policies. In addition, certain 
incentive systems also increase the ability for cooperation. In terms of a 
strategic thinking, the payment to the managers will be dependent on 
the success of the partnership. Thus an enthusiasm in the sense of 
“spirit of cooperation” will be created. The strike for a goal is the 
configuration-factor for prudential incentive system. The success will 
be then readable on incentive-factors, for instance development of 
innovations, behaviour patterns, time periods and other economic 
factors. It has to be arranged on which hierarchical level and in which 
division the incentives shall reach. Finally a decision about the 
compound of monetary and non-monetary payments is required. The 
partners always have to control that their incentive systems harmonize. 
They have to keep in mind that risks the executives have to take are in 
the beginning of a cooperation much higher than those risks that they 
have to manage inside of their company.  
4.5 Control considerations 
Earlier, we have described how important managerial decisions are in 
order to lead the strategic alliance into success. Therefore we also 
described several success factors. However, in this relation we have to 
know what shall be continuously monitored and by whom. We will 
differentiate in this chapter between non-financial and financial control 
as well as the operating control. 
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As a non-financial tool we can mention the black box47, which gives a 
partner a sense of strategic control over the direction of the strategic 
alliance.48 Control must be based on other dimensions than traditional 
legal rights and contracts. The involvement in the planning process as 
well as in the reporting process are examples for that. The better the 
assignment of people the more efficient the control works. Having 
euphoric people in the cooperation involved helps to put less control on 
them but more on other aspects. The involvement of executives in the 
board of directors who are active in the business implies a strong source 
of control and helps to pursue the partners’ strategic intents. All 
responsibilities that were spelled out have to be monitored as well. 
There has to be also a monitoring mechanism regarding on the 
agreement of the parties how to share the output of the strategic 
alliance. The capacity of the strategic alliance in the sense of not 
loosing money has to be controlled as well as any capacity expansion 
decisions. If a company has joint ventures in other countries, then the 
maintenance of price stability will be dependent on the capacity 
balancing of each joint venture, so that no one will be under pressure to 
export into other territories. There is also the type of a strategic alliance 
that works without investments. Those alliances work because of social 
contacts and interpersonal relationships but take a long time to 
establish. It includes social norms, expectations and appreciations of 
taking and giving. Taking a minority, cross-ownership financial stake in 
the partner can be seen as a complement to the social control not as tool 
to dictate own views.  
In contrary, financial control must be as compatible as possible with 
both partners’ control systems and needs, hopefully without installing 
two separate systems. In the short run the revenues have to be 
monitored in order to know about successful transactions in the market. 
But other factors have also to be taken into consideration. A continually 
reassessment is necessary to modify the strategic directions by 
obtaining early warning signals for instance when a new competitor 
47 see chapter 4.1 
48 Lorange, P. and Roos, J. (1992), p.112-117 
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enters the market. A scanning of the environment is necessary. A 
planning committee should meet on a regular basis to discuss 
implications of changes in critical environmental assumptions. It has to 
be clear who monitors what as well as who is doing what inside the 
strategic alliance. If this takes place early enough ameliorating 
modifications can be instituted. Another issue that deals with the 
strategic programming is that reactions from the environment, 
customers and competitors have to be reassessed. Executives need to 
receive a clear delineation of their tasks and responsibilities to assess 
and monitor competitor and customer responses. Strategic budget 
expenditures also require careful monitoring. Surveillance is necessary 
because financial resources have to be held back in response to 
emerging strategic opportunities and to be able to apply sanctions.  
While financial control holds managers accountable for a limited 
number of objective output measures, operating control recognizes that 
all sorts of events outside the managers’ influence may affect their 
performance, for instance bankruptcy of a customer.49 The operating 
control evaluates the managers’ decisions and actions. While financial 
control would punish managers even during a recession, operating 
control may reward them. Financial control is less suitable in fast-
moving industries with high levels of uncertainty but is always easy to 
implement and places the fewest demands on corporate management. 
Operating control involves qualitative and quantitative measures that 
capture the nuances of a particular business. To use operating control 
efficiently, managers have to be familiar with the businesses in the 
firm’s portfolio and they need to have some experience. Operating 
systems require more interaction between corporate and business unit 
managers. Strategic planning sessions, operating reviews, capital-
budgeting discussions are nice examples how to observe managers’ 
performance by the corporate management.  
49 Collis, D. and Montgomery, C. (2001), p.633-647 
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“No control system can be assessed in isolation. Rather, its 
effectiveness depends on the degree of fit with the company’s particular 
set of resources and businesses.”50  
4.6 The environment 
The following part relates to the legal environment, competitive 
restrictions as well as to trade barriers. Those aspects have to be taken 
into consideration when entering into a strategic alliance. The legal 
form of the strategic alliance has to be chosen by, of course, the 
partners.  
4.6.1 Legal considerations51 
In a democracy the influence of political and legal norms sets limits to 
entrepreneurial behaviour. Norms are the result of social relationships 
of certain societies and their underlying ideals. The companies have 
therefore also to adhere also “non-laws” for instance good faith and 
morality. These are informal rules, which were built up and 
consolidated from the tradition and history of a society.52 That is a 
general framework concerning the treatment of a partner, but which is 
also dependent on right-consciousness and right-handling of a society.   
4.6.2 Aspects of anti-trust laws53 
Because the form of appearance of strategic alliances is very complex, 
it is difficult to determine abstract rules that appraise the legal 
competition. Strategic alliance will be entered because no partner 
would be able to achieve the aimed at targets with his own force or 
resources. But there is the problem that this association could be an 
instrument for segmenting or partitioning the market. This is the reason 
why competition authorities deal with that problem. Thus competitive 
restrictions have to be taken into consideration. International alliances 
50 Collis, D. and Montgomery, C. (2001), p.640 
51 Krieger, C. (2001), p.205-207 
52 for traditional and social rules see chapter 5.4 (Cultural Fit) 
53 Kartte, W. (1992), p.401-420; Krieger, C. (2001), p.230-233  
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are conjunctions, which nurture reciprocative understanding in the areas 
of economic policy, corporate policy and mentality of the partner. 
Therefore their intentions have to be clearly acquired – will it be a 
positive, eligible cooperation or will negative effects occur? If a tuned 
behaviour exists there will not be any rediscovery-competition for the 
development and distribution of new technologies.  
Nevertheless strategic alliances underlie regulations of competition. A 
company cannot cope with the research and development by itself 
because the product life cycle will be shortened more and more. 
Therefore a decision has to be taken whether a company is able to bear 
the expenditures by itself or not. Two dimensions have to be 
distinguished: the competition-proportion between the alliance partners 
and their market position in proportion to their competitors and thus to 
the whole competitive situation on a market. On the one hand, strategic 
alliances reduce competition or the stress of competition, for instance 
through price and quantity arrangements or through establishing an 
oligopoly on the world markets, but on the other hand there exists the 
possibility to use a certain know how in marketable solutions. Co-
operations lead to a change of the market structure but are basically 
accepted. They are audited towards market control when they reach a 
certain size. There will not be any problem if the resulting market 
structure leads to a functional competition. Agreements that could lead 
to a limitation of competition between independent companies are in 
general forbidden. In demarcation to a fusion, strategic alliances 
contain elements of coordination-behaviour of independent companies 
as well as structural changing like building up a new company or the 
acquisition of stakes. In the opinion of the EU-commission strategic 
alliances can therefore be a dynamic competition factor, which 
accelerates the process of economic integration. Positive effect can be 
expected if huge investments are made to create new capacities. In 
general you can say that the EU-community law is more tolerant than 
national anti-trust laws. In this context we dispense with a detailed 
description of any national or EU law because this is transcending our 
actual theme.  
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National governments commonly use tariffs and trade restrictions to 
raise entry barriers for foreign firms and protect domestic producers 
from competition. One might get the impression that foreign 
competitors are held at bay in the grey area of the GATT (General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) by always more inventive tricks, for 
instance by anti-dumping procedures and exaggerated local content 
regulations. Strategic alliances are often used to bridge over trade 
barriers by getting in cooperation with a company inside a protectionist 
country. These kind of strategic alliances could normally be harmless 
but against the background of the increasing protectionism they can be 
competitively problematic. It is therefore to prove how open the 
markets really are when judging strategic alliances. 
If cooperation took into place, new standards through the synergic 
effects can be set. Thus strategic alliances can also establish new entry 
barriers. 
4.6.3 Changes of market conditions 
Markets, which are the main environment for strategic alliances, are 
very dynamic. The market environment, in contrast to legal and social 
norms, could change rapidly. These changes are not always predictable, 
which influence both, the partners of a strategic alliance and also the 
alliance itself. The development can also be so large, that it destroys the 
basis for the alliance itself. Thus there will always be a certain dynamic 
in building and abandoning strategic alliances in the market and also 
existing alliances have to be adapted on a continuing basis.  
 64 
5 Perspectives and Influences 
5.1 Introduction 
In the next part we will present different factors to distinguish different 
types of strategic alliances and the consequences following out of these 
differences. These factors will show the extreme heterogeneity of 
strategic alliances and the broad range of alternatives a company has if 
it wants to form strategic alliances. This will confirm that for a 
successful decision making a broader view is adequate. Some of these 
factors will be a kind of perspective how to look on and analyse 
strategic alliances. Others will be factors, which can be decided when 
forming an alliance. All have huge impact on the strategic alliance. To 
underlay these abstract and concrete practical examples will be 
presented. Also interdependencies between some of these factors will 
be shown. This will confirm the high complexity of this subject and 
will lead to a better understanding. The following factors are for sure 
not complete list but the most important are mentioned and the high 
number of influencing factors on strategic alliances will become 
clearer. 
5.2 Horizontal – vertical – lateral 
One way to look on strategic alliances is to distinguish them in 
horizontal, vertical and lateral. This differentiation is based on a market 
view. Investigated is the relation between the partners anent to the 
market. A clear distinction is obviously only possible if strategic 
alliances with two partners are analysed. Nevertheless the findings from 
this two-partner view are transferable to a case with more partners. 
This factor is a kind of perspective. Companies have only sometimes 
the possibility to choose these categories. Especially between vertical 
strategic alliances and the two others, the possibilities to choose are 
very rare. The possibility exists only indirectly combined with in- or 
outsourcing. Horizontal and lateral strategic alliances are often 
substitutes. Normally the restriction of the existence of adequate 
partners for lateral strategic alliances is deciding. 
 Horizontal strategic alliances are defined as alliances between 
companies that are competing directly against each other on the same 
market. There are two main alternatives of horizontal strategic 
alliances. First simply one common step in the value chain could be put 
together. 
 
Purchasing R & D Production Marketi
Purchasing R & D Production Marketi
Value chain company A
Value chain company B  
ng Distribution 
ng Distribution 
Exhibit 7: Value chains in horizontal strategic alliances 
In this case the companies work together in one step of the value chain. 
Principally every step in the value chain is suitable to be integrated in a 
strategic alliance. The classic example in such a case is the cooperation 
in research and development. A lot of examples can be found there in 
practice. One newer example would be the cooperation between AMD 
and IBM in developing 65 and 45 nanometre structures for 
semiconductor technologies54. The development of such much smaller 
structures is extremely expensive and needs a lot of high-qualified 
employees. Therefore the benefits of this strategic alliance are obvious. 
Both companies will save costs by using economies of scale. Without 
this alliance both companies would have to do the same work alone. 
The saved costs are probably very high. The other main advantage that 
                                                     
54www.heise.de 
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this alliance can probably achieve is due to a higher research capacity a 
faster development of the product or differently formulated a better 
product in the same time. These advantages are crucial in this high tech 
industry. Also such an alliance means a splitting of the risk, which is 
bounded with such a high investment. This might not be in this case so 
significant but there are a lot of examples in the high tech industry 
where the benefits of the expected product is not clear because there is 
no market before the product is introduced. Another important 
advantage of such an alliance in R & D is that partners can benefit from 
complementary abilities. The main motives of these strategic alliances 
in research and development are cost, time and risk advantages and 
entrance to better knowledge and technologies of the partner. The big 
advantage especially in high tech industries is obvious what leads to a 
very high number of strategic alliances with this conceptual design. 
Other examples could be the conjoint development of lithographic 
masks for small structured chips by Infineon, AMD and DuPont 
Photomasks. The list is easily enlargeable.  
Off course R & D is not the only step in the value chain for such 
alliances. Especially named should be some other steps whose motives, 
benefits and risks differ significantly. 
Horizontal strategic alliances in purchasing are very common too. The 
main motive in this step is saving costs. This form can be often found in 
mature industries with a high price competition. One good example can 
be found in the automobile industry. A lot of European car producers 
pool their supplies and buy a big amount of their overall purchasing 
together. The main advantage is that the car producers gain bargaining 
power and are able to force the suppliers to offer products with very 
small margins. The big danger in these strategic alliances is that 
especially in mature industries the companies could loose their ability 
to differentiate their products from their competitors. So the market and 
the products have to be monitored carefully. The Japanese car 
producers had to go another way because their outsourcing policy 
would make it more difficult to differentiate their products if they 
would pool their supplies. Especially Toyota goes another way of a 
network of vertical strategic alliances. 
 In the production such alliances can be found as well. Producing 
together could save costs by using economics of scale. Not necessarily 
the whole production has to be put together. Especially parts, which are 
standardised with a low differentiation potential and no big quality 
differences are predestined for such alliances because then the risk of 
convergence of the competition position of the involved parties is not 
there.  
Strategic alliances can also be built around the value chain steps 
“marketing” and “distribution”. Examples can be found if the 
distribution is very expensive and the same marketing or distribution 
does not destroy the differences of the products from a customer’s 
perspective.  
Another form of horizontal alliance is characterised through a different 
cooperation within the value chains. 
Purchasing R & D Production Marketing
Purchasing R & D Production Marketing
Value chain company A
Value chain company b  
Distribution
Distribution
Exhibit 8: Value chains in horizontal strategic alliances without pooling of 
interests 
The difference of this form of horizontal strategic alliance is that the 
partners do not work on the same value chain steps together. It is more 
a complementary combination of the best practice at each value chain 
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step. In this case company B uses the better distribution system of 
company A and as consideration A uses the better marketing of B. The 
grey arrows would be alternative possibilities. This form can be found 
when a company wants to entry a new market. A company can use the 
distribution system of an existent company. Another example would be 
a small innovative company whose R & D division is used by an old 
big company with the right distribution channels. The motives of such 
forms could vary from entry in another market or access to technologies 
to simply usage of a better value chain step and therefore achieved cost 
advantages. Especially this form of strategic alliance can lead to a form 
of higher dependency than in relation to the previously described ones 
because a company, which uses the abilities of another company tends 
to ignore the improvement of their own abilities in this sector. 
Generally this problem can be reduced if the management is 
encouraged learning processes with the goal to learn from the abilities 
of the partner. If this is consequently done the dependency is could 
decrease. 
The categorisation of these forms of strategic alliances is not really 
clear. The constellation can be seen as a combination of two alliances 
as described first. As well this form of strategic alliance could be seen 
as related to vertical forms because it would be possible to imagine the 
company B as two companies divided in one which does everything 
besides the distribution and another which only does the distribution. 
Then it would be a vertical strategic alliance. The frontiers between 
these forms are not really clear. 
As last form of horizontal strategic alliance a less on the value chain 
focused form will be presented. The motive of influencing the 
competition can be achieved by horizontal strategic alliances. The 
companies can influence the competition in different ways. They can 
simply coordinate their prices or they can coordinate their markets with 
the consequence that in one part of the world only one company offers 
their products. One example would be the vitamin trust. The companies 
BASF, Hoffmann-La-Roche and Rhône-Poulec coordinated in the 
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whole 1990s their prices55 of vitamins and divided the world market 
and due to this abolished any competition. Such behaviour is in most 
cases illegal. Normally this building of trusts leads to financial 
consequences because of civil and competition law and it leads to 
penalties due to criminal law. So considering the legal environment is 
crucial for such alliances. Also such trusts can suffer from control 
problems and the attractiveness of the outsider position. 
A big problem of all forms of horizontal strategic alliances is 
opportunistic behaviour of the involved parties. The involved 
companies compete per definition on the same market. Therefore the 
tricked company suffers double from opportunistic behaviour. First 
they loose knowledge or something else without real payment and then 
second this knowledge is used to compete against them. The problem 
which results from this risk is that companies in horizontal alliances 
might act with caution. For example they could not provide the partner 
the newest knowledge. The alliance could suffer from such behaviour 
extremely. Measurements, described in chapter 4.3.6 have to be done. 
Another form of strategic alliance is named lateral.  
 
55 http://www.admin.ch/cp/d/38fd881f.0@fwsrvg.bfi.admin.ch.html 
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Exhibit 9: Value chains in lateral strategic alliances 
The lateral strategic alliance is characterised through two companies 
which have al least one common step in the value chain but are not 
competing on the same market. Sometimes the term diagonal is used 
synonym for lateral. The advantages and motives of this form of 
strategic alliance are very similar to the advantages and motives of the 
horizontal strategic alliance where the same interests of one common 
value chain step are pooled. The advantages, which result from 
alliances in the different value chain steps are principally the same as 
described before. The disadvantages and problems are different. The 
effect of the different markets, the partners compete in, is positive. The 
consequences of opportunistic behaviour are not as extreme as they are 
in horizontal alliances because normally a tricked company is not 
punished double. The partner does not compete directly against him. 
This opens the possibility for a more trustful less reserved behaviour. 
Of course this advantage is not given if the risk is there that the tricking 
partner is entering the other market.  
The main problem of these lateral strategic alliances is that every value 
step of a company not exists necessarily in another company which is 
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 not a competitor. And even if such a potential partner exists over time, 
problems may arise from a different developing environment. The risk 
of failures due to this is relatively high.  
Examples for such forms of strategic alliances can be found in 
extremely different sectors. Banks and insurance companies often use 
the same distribution channels. Examples56 are the Allianz and 
Dresdner Bank, Deutscher Herold and Deutsche Bank or ERGO and 
HypoVereinsbank. In each case the distribution step in the value chain 
is the same. Therefore a pooling of the distribution can save costs. 
Other very current examples can be found in the entertainment industry. 
The recently appeared movie Matrix reloaded was accompanied with 
the appearance of the Matrix reloaded computer game. In this case 
game producer and movie maker are using economies of scale in the 
production of the contents and in marketing. Such a big promotion as 
this game received would never be possible for a separate appearance.  
Vertical strategic alliances are built as followed: 
Value chai
Value chain company B
n company A
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Exhibit 10: Value chains and vertical strategic alliances 
Vertical strategic alliances differ in some points fundamentally. No 
interests are pooled in this form of strategic alliance. The partners are in 
a supplier-customer-relationship. The vertical strategic alliance is 
characterised through a more intense relationship than it would be 
normal in other forms of strategic alliances. The main motives for such 
alliances are to achieve cost, quality and risk advantages. There are 
different forms of vertical strategic alliances to achieve these 
56Bauchspieß, Benno 
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advantages. Cost advantages for example can be achieved with 
concepts like just-in-time delivery or vendor-managed inventory. Both 
concepts aim to reduce the stock and save costs due to this. Supplier 
can benefit from the possibility to smooth demand because of better 
information. Quality improvements can be achieved by a better 
coordination of the supplies and the needs. Supplier development could 
be one form of this coordination. Supply risk57 can be reduced by a 
fixed supplier relationship. Toyota has a lot of vertical strategic 
alliances. The lean enterprise concept of Toyota includes a big network 
of vertical strategic alliances.  
Important for vertical strategic alliances is transparency. Without 
transparency a better coordination is not possible. This transparency 
requires trustfulness because transparency enlarges the risks of 
opportunistic behaviour. The gained knowledge of the other company 
could be used to apply more pressure on the supplier because of a 
disclosure of the price structure or the supplier could use the gained 
knowledge of technologies to work with competitors together. The risk 
can be decreased by dependencies. This at the same time enlarges the 
risk to suffer from inefficiencies due to lower flexibility.  From a 
customer perspective the types of supply which are purchased from a 
partner of a strategic alliance have to be chosen carefully because the 
coordination is not cheap. Therefore products with a high impact on 
financial results should be chosen. A balanced relationship is more 
important in vertical alliances than in other forms. The benefits of 
vertical strategic alliances are very different for both partners. More 
than in different forms of strategic alliances it has to be always a win-
win situation which is not always easy in a changing environment.  
Strategic alliances as described before are very heterogeneous. From 
this heterogeneity results a high complexity and difficulties if advices 
for forming strategic alliances are questioned. The plenty of alternatives 
only offered by this market perspective gives a picture how difficult it 
is to form a successful strategic alliance.  
57 the risk to be out of supply 
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5.3 Input and Output of resources58 
A very theoretical, abstract and unique framework concerning the 
classification of strategic alliances was developed by Lorange and 
Roos. This framework is then applied to the formation and evolution of 
strategic alliances as well as to general management processes. They 
distinguish between generic motives for strategic alliances and four 
different archetypes.  
 
  Business market position 
  Leader Follower 
Core Defend Catch up Strategic 
importance in 
parent’s 
portfolio 
Peripheral Remain Restructure 
                                       
Exhibit 11: Generic motives for strategic alliances 
As can be seen in the figure above a company has to contemplate the 
strategic importance of one business within the strategic alliance and 
how it fits into the overall portfolio. Is this business part of the core 
activities or is it more peripheral? The core activity of IBM, for 
example, is the computer business while producing displays for mobile 
phones is seen as more peripheral activity. Is the firm’s position in that 
business a leader or more a follower? For instance a leader may have a 
larger market share, a leading technology or superior quality. Four 
different generic motives for entering into a strategic alliance emerge 
when looking on the two dimensions- defensive, catch up, remain or 
restructure.   
                                                     
58 Lorange, P. and Roos, J. (1992) 
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  Parents’ input of resources 
 
 
Sufficient for 
short-term 
operations 
Sufficient for 
long-term 
operations 
To parents Ad hoc pool Consortium Parents’ 
retrieval of 
output Retain 
Project-based 
joint venture 
Full-blown joint 
venture 
 
Exhibit 12: Archetypes of strategic alliances 
Here the questions occur how many resources have been put in the 
strategic alliance and retrieved from it. On the one hand a parent may 
take back all the resources that have been generated through the 
strategic alliance, for instance financial profits or managers who have 
worked in the alliance for a project, or on the other hand generated 
output may be retained in the alliance itself. Then the question arises 
whether the strategic alliance is aligned to have short-term or long-term 
operations. The longer the operation will take place the more resources 
will be put in. Again, four different archetypes of strategic alliances are 
pointed out when looking at the two dimensions: 
• The ad hoc pool in which the parties put into the strategic 
alliance a minimum of resources, often on a temporary basis; 
the generated resources will bill plowed back into the parents’ 
own houses. 
• When looking into a full-blown joint venture, the amount of 
resources that is put into the alliance is much higher and the 
generated resources will be retained in the alliance itself 
• In the consortium-type the parents are willing to put in more 
resources, but still the value created inside the strategic 
alliance will be disbursed back to the parents. 
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• Concerning the project-based joint venture, it is exactly the 
other way around, compared to the consortium-type. 
It would go too far here to discuss deeply the motives and archetypes 
but the common framework should be understood. There is to say that 
those two frameworks are also linked together, for instance in the 
project-based joint venture only few resources are put in by the parties, 
the gained resources are being retained in the particular joint venture 
and we can talk about being a leader in the particular business segment 
but which tends to be a peripheral one in the overall portfolio strategies 
of the participating firms.  
Earlier in the thesis we talked about the formation of strategic alliances 
and mentioned keywords like strategic match, stakeholder blessing, 
strategic plan and internal support. These four issues can be applied to 
the four different archetypes.  
When we are in an ad hoc pool strategic match problems occur if one 
partner tends to be an established entity and the other partner an 
entrepreneurial one. In relation to the stakeholder blessing the threat of 
takeover arises if the partners have different sizes. Concerning the 
strategic plan the partners have to look after the compatibility of 
resources in the way complementing each other. When talking about 
the internal support several meeting in that stage are necessary.  
In the case of a consortium the strategic match includes 
complementarities between more or less equal partners to achieve 
congruence. For a stakeholder blessing an involvement of the key 
people is necessary while cooperation among the partners is essential 
when mentioning the strategic plan. To ensure internal support a good 
flow of information and an interaction among the partners is crucial. A 
balanced input-output-ratio of resources has to be reached.  
The project-based joint venture is used to enter into a new market area. 
To provide the strategic match the partners have to find enough 
overlapping between their perceptions without feeling threatened. The 
exposing of strengths helps them to overcome any fears of a win-loose 
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scenario. To develop a business plan an establishment of 
complementarities between the parties and the security for 
competitiveness are quite necessary. Securing internal support deals 
with the delineation of the tasks who is doing what. The output can be 
measured by profit and sales. 
The strategic match in a full-blown joint venture deals with the equality 
of each partner. They need to have a clear understanding of the nature 
of the catch-up situation. All stakeholders have to realize that this 
cooperation is “the way”. To provide a working strategic plan the 
parties have to put in all of their business activities into the alliance. 
Therefore a careful assessment of how the combined entity should be 
reconstructed is needed. The tasks of the management become here 
more and more important. The output can be measured by the return on 
investment, market share, costs, revenues and so on.  
By that description a clear course towards the necessity of the 
managements’ tasks and the deep linkage between the involved parties 
in the way of taking many aspects into consideration can be seen.  
A good example, which explains the importance of the formation 
process, is the telecommunication sector. One can notice that the 
formation of strategic international alliances to meet the needs of 
transnational clients represents an important step in the 
internationalisation process of companies in the telecommunication 
sector. The operation of the corporate networks of client companies, 
without solving continuity within the heterogeneous union of associated 
supplier networks, requires that the suppliers' service systems are 
closely integrated on an international level. On a worldwide level, the 
move towards alliances is wide-ranging. The most well-known 
alliances are Concert (uniting the American MCI with British 
Telecom), Atlas (Deutsche Telecom and France Telecom, and others) 
and the World Partners alliance. The latter currently includes AT&T, 
Singapore Telecom and the Japanese KDD among its leader. 
The evolution process can be also applied to the evolution within and 
between the archetypes. In the case of an ad hoc pool one can expect 
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the parties to deal with ameliorating issues on their own. They have to 
secure continuously their leadership position and each of them has to 
improve in a better way.  
Additionally, in a consortium type each partner has to play his 
complementary role and the strategic alliance is seen as a contract-
regulating institution where the involvement process takes place as 
describes in the chapter of evolution.  
In the project-based joint venture the learning of common 
organizational issues takes place. The partners have to become more 
efficient in coordinating the uses of resources and they have to adapt 
new opportunities. But the death rate is that stage is quite high. 
Managerial and human aspects as described in the chapter about 
success factors play therefore an important role. 
The evolution in the type of a full-blown joint venture includes high 
efforts in the way of making a strategic alliance successful. If the 
strategic alliance does not work properly each partner will end in a 
situation of financial ownership that can be used as an exit mechanism.  
The evolution between the archetypes is dependent on how the parents 
see their resource positioning and their strategic position. This 
evolution process takes place because of the parents’ shifting 
perspectives. In the case of a shifting from an ad hoc pool towards a 
consortium type the alliance is loosing its business leadership position 
and becomes a follower. But actually this shift does not imply the move 
towards a follower. In practice, a strategic alliance can still be in a 
leader position while putting in more resource in connection with a 
long-term orientation. There is the potential to win through further 
operations. A shift from a project-based joint venture to a full-blown 
joint venture implicit the same as before but of course with the 
difference that the output will be retained in the alliance. A change in 
the way of handling the parents’ retrieval of output can be seen in a 
move from an ad hoc pool to a project-based joint venture or from a 
consortium to a full-blown joint venture. The issue is of course to retain 
the resources. This has to do with a re-prioritisation of the business in 
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the portfolio because the core competencies do not tend to be 
maintained through the strategic alliance. Thus we can see a 
development from core to peripheral. Because of life-cycle 
considerations we suggest that the firm should redeploy its core 
competencies into new core businesses. The last possibility in that 
evolution could be the development from an ad hoc pool to a full-blown 
joint venture via the consortium or the project-based joint venture. The 
importance of the business within its portfolio will be reclassified and a 
facing up to the deterioration of the business’s competitive position is 
crucial. In that context there is to say that the evolution process is 
dependent on the product life cycle of a specific product. If the product 
becomes a commodity, there will be less a problem with the creation of 
an independent entity.  
Another aspect dealing with the archetypes is the management process 
especially the planning and control for the four archetypes. Several 
factors can be allocated to each archetype. The authors presume that 
one partner is large and well established while the other one is small 
and entrepreneurial. To develop a strategic plan in an ad hoc pool a 
focus on creating clarity regarding the compatibility of efforts, 
technologies, tasks and so on is necessary. Difficulties regarding 
definitions of standards and cultures as well as the formalization of the 
organization (versus the entrepreneurship) need to be captured in 
planning this ad hoc pool stage. The same issues apply to the case of a 
consortium. Here the parties tend to be more even in size as mentioned 
before and the consortium is larger in its scope than the ad hoc pool. It 
is important to know how advantages of scale and scope can be 
achieved and also by whom. The planning recipe for the project-based 
joint venture is to develop “a sense of planning to allow the know-how 
exchange through the skeleton entity with a minimum of efforts and 
with no more additional resources than intended. The planning 
emphasizes training, institutionalisation of know-how transfers as well 
as servicing routines.”59 The planning in a full-blown joint venture 
59 Lorange, P. and Roos, J. (1992), p.118 
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equals the planning in full-blown organisation, which has been created 
through a merger.  
You can see that the model has a distinct picture of the size relations 
and we think that it is only applicable if these prerequisites are fulfilled. 
You can see the development of planning processes through the four 
archetypes takes into consideration more and more aspects as described 
commonly in the evolution-, motives- and success factors for strategic 
alliances.     
Concerning control measures in an ad hoc pool it has to be observed 
whether the intended output from the pool efforts has been achieved or 
not. Setting control points, for instance checking the level of customer 
satisfaction and monitoring the market share, is a helpful tool. These 
types of control measures are also appropriate in the case of a 
consortium. In addition, resource utilization becomes crucial as well as 
the equity ratio of the partners. In a project-based joint venture the 
focus is on performance outputs of financial nature, for instance costs, 
sales and profits. A control of the strategic fit is required here. For 
further details we refer the reader to chapter 4.1.2.3. Control measures 
in a full-blown joint venture are calculated with the return on 
investment coupled with other control measures as described for the 
project-based joint venture. Other factors like business climate, 
movements of the competitors and reactions for customers are involved 
because it is essential to pay attention to environmental factors and 
circumstances to let the strategic alliance succeed in its long-term 
business intention.  
There is also the need to tailor the planning and control approaches. If a 
business position is strongly combined with a core portfolio strategy the 
emphasis will be on the development and maintenance of the black box 
position for one part60, i.e. a defensive strategic intent. If the strong 
business position is coupled with a peripheral portfolio role the 
60 mentioned in chapter 4.1.2.3 
 80 
emphasis will not be on non-financial controls, so senior management 
involvement is limited. Planning and financial control combined with 
strategic programming efforts are needed to reach the strategic intent.  
In contrary, if there is a weak business strategy position combined with 
a core portfolio strategy the emphasis will not be any more on the black 
box dimension, i.e. catching up strategic intent. If we have a weak 
business strategic position coupled with a peripheral portfolio role there 
will be neither much non-financial control nor many attempts to 
establish a black box position. Planning and financial controls 
consistent with the size and complexity of the task are relevant. If the 
strategic alliance is quite large and complex, formal planning and 
qualitative control will take place. If it is quite a small one non-
financial control will be used. 
Too little planning effort is often used by the stronger partner for a 
takeover. It is the task of the management how they shift their emphasis 
on control over the time because there is the need to change the 
financial control form from physical to a more decentralised one. 
When mentioning the human resource management function it includes 
the assignment and motivation of people to create a fine value within 
the strategic alliance. Attention is required on job skills, communication 
compatibility, coordination and so on. Human resources have to be 
managed strategically in order to sustain and enhance their 
competencies. A successful allocation of people is essential to bring the 
strategic alliance on the right way. A transmission of the human 
resource management function to the different archetypes is, of course, 
possible. In the case of an ad hoc pool the executives have to see their 
assignment only in the short-term with clearly defined goals. A long-
term career planning will not take place in that situation. The human 
resource function will be carried out by each partner and must be well 
coordinated as in any other case. One might find a huge number of 
involved executives in the consortium type. They need to encompass 
flexibility, sensitivity to various cultural settings as well as the ability to 
adapt new colleagues. All parties must find ways to cooperate.  A good 
example is large engineering consulting firms assigned to various 
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construction projects. In project-based joint ventures individual or 
group work is required but without much supervision or demand 
additional support like any kind of input of a parent. The managers can 
be seen as skilled entrepreneurs. Each partner will deal the human 
resource function, with a good coordination, independently. In the case 
of a full-blown joint venture one is being assessed how well the 
strategic alliance works. Strong and fully-fledged managers as well as 
such a human resource management function have to be established. 
The executives have to work closely together and shall not forget the 
development of new human resource capabilities.  
It is quite simple to see how important human resource management 
becomes when dealing with the four archetypes.   
This part shows how small differences in the intention of the strategic 
alliance lead to bigger consequences in nearly all other for strategic 
alliances relevant areas as described above. This reflects the high 
complexity of this subject and confirms the difficulty to give advices 
for forming strategic alliances. Also the interweavement of the relevant 
aspects of strategic alliances can be recognised. 
5.4 Cultural Fit 
The cultural aspect of a strategic alliance should not be underestimated. 
The failure of an alliance between the producers of tires, Dunlop and 
Pirelli, in the year 1981 can be traced back to cultural 
incompatibilities.61 In this particular case, the management was unable 
to find a synthesis between the English and Italian culture. Management 
means, to delegate many tasks to other persons. In order to do this 
successfully, you have to know which tasks have to be fulfilled and 
which employees are able to execute this task. In order to understand 
these persons, the manager has to know their cultural background, 
which determines the future behaviour of these persons. Thus the 
willingness of both partners to accept the geographically and policy-
61 Bronder, C. and Pritzl, R. (1992), pp. 36-40 
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grown culture of the other one is vital for a successful and long-lasting 
cooperation. Hence the goal has to be, to find a cultural fit by a 
compatible system of shared values, stiles and cultures while 
considering the national peculiarities. 
“When challenges by the presence of differences, culture becomes 
much like the air we breathe: We begin to take it for granted. We think 
about the air only when it is taken away, and we think about culture 
only when the familiar behaviours we learned during our socialization 
fail to help us achieve our goals in different social settings.”62 
Consequently, culture is a very broad concept and it is very hard to find 
a reliable definition. Ajiferuke puts it: “Culture is one of those terms 
that defy a single all-purpose definition, and there are almost as many 
meanings of culture as people using the term.”63. Thus there are many 
different definitions of culture. In this thesis, we will use one of the 
broadest ones, which was first used by Kroeber and Kluckholm64:  
• Culture is made by humans; 
It is the result of collective thinking and acting. 
• Culture is and interindividual phenomenon; 
A group delivers it, but its existence is not bound to the 
existence of a single individual 
• Culture is acquired; 
Therefore culture is also called the “social heritage” of a 
society 
• Culture is transmitted by symbols and manifests itself in these 
• Culture determines the individual’s behaviour; 
62 Brislin, R. (1993), p. 169 
63 Ajiferuke, M. and Boddewyn, J. (1970), p. 154 
64 Kroeber, A.L. and Kluckhohn, P. (1952), p. 181 et sqq 
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It encompasses all rules, norms, and codes of behaviour, which 
affect the behaviour of its members. 
• Culture strives for internal consistence; 
i.e. that a society tries to be free of inconsistent beliefs, norms 
and codes of behaviour 
• Culture is a tool 
It is a tool, a society uses to adapt to its environment. It 
provides every individual with methods and tools to deal with 
the everyday problems. 
• Culture can be adapted 
Cultures underlie an adaptive process. Cultural systems tend to 
adapt itself to a changing environment 
In the literature, the topic of culture in strategic alliances and especially 
its importance is heavily discussed. On the one side, many authors 
claim that in a company, the behaviour of individuals has to be rational 
and that there is no room for cultural differences.65 
On the other side are authors that claim that there are many different 
cultural environments, which determine for example the understanding 
of time or the optimal way of working.66 
One of the most famous examples for this debate is the discussion if the 
so-called “Lean Management”, which was made popular by the 
“International Motor Vehicle Study” of the MIT (Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology), is universally applicable. The study shows 
how Japanese automotive producers used the help of a combination of 
65 Negandhi, A.R., (1985), p. 69-97; Harbison, F. and Myers, Ch.A., (1959); 
Vroom, V.H. and Yetton, P.W. (1973); Koontz, M. & O’Donnell, C. (1976) 
66 Roberts, K.H. (1970); Triandis, H.C. (1972); Bass, B.M. and Burger, P.C. 
(1979); England, G.W. and Negandhi, A.R. (1985); Laurent, A. (1981); 
Hofstede, G. (1980); Park, K.K. (1983); Ronen, p. (1986) 
 instruments to gain considerable advantages in productivity. It is 
heavily discussed, if this combination can be used in Europe too. Some 
authors like Pfeiffer and Weiss67 do not see any problems; while others 
like Klimecki and Probst68 argue that not the instruments are the best at 
Lean Management, but the culture-specific character of Japanese 
Managers and workers who can always be committed to continuous 
improvement. Thus there are many influences, which have to be 
considered carefully. To be able to do this systematically, we will use 
the layer model of the environment by Dülfer69. 
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Exhibit 13: Vertical cut through Dülfer’s layered model of the 
environment70  
This model shows how cultures develop and how different parts of the 
culture influence each other, starting with the natural circumstances and 
ending with the cultural influence on the company. Each of these layers 
                                                     
Natural  circumstances 
Knowledge of Processes 
Cultural determined moral concepts 
       Social relationships and commitments 
Legal and politic norms 
Task-environment and external 
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67 Pfeiffer, W. and Weiss, E. (1990) 
68 Klimecki, R.G. and Probst, G.J.B. (1993), p. 260 
69 Dülfer, E., in: Pausenberger, E. (1981), p. 197 et sqq. 
70 Dülfer, E. (1995), p. 218 
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influences the other one – either directly or indirectly through other 
layers. In the following we will have a more detailed look into each of 
these parts. 
5.4.1 Natural Circumstances  
The fact that natural circumstances are vital for the success of a 
company is beyond all questions. The natural environment with its 
topology, the availability of vital resources and the climate build the 
basis for the culture – and thus also for the success of a strategic 
alliance. The country’s influence is the most obvious one, because the 
country offers the basic resources for a good efficiency and production. 
But there are also less obvious influences like the infrastructure. 
5.4.2 Knowledge of processes and cultural 
determined moral concepts 
Every society has found different ways and solutions to manage the 
forces of nature and climatic conditions. Due to these different 
circumstances, many different views on the world and many different 
religions developed. These solutions build the basis for all processes 
and ideas in business. It has influences on the way of communicating, 
the way the individual is seen, the way time is sensed, and, as 
mentioned before, on the religion.  
In everyday business of strategic alliances problems with intercultural 
communication occur very often, for instance when managers from 
different countries meet in negotiations. Thereby it can be seen that 
especially in long-lasting projects, problems in intercultural 
communication can have big negative consequences for the whole 
project. To get a deeper understanding of the foreign culture, it is 
inevitable to learn the foreign language. The other language is not only 
a medium for communication, but represents also a part of the foreign 
culture. Even the usage of a translator does not always help because 
many words do not have a perfect translation in other languages. The 
translator is also a good example for cultural differences. Western 
managers see a translator as a “black box” and expect a neutral 
translation of the words. In other cultures, as for example Japan, very 
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often the translator has a dialogue with the receiver of the translation. 
Japanese expect a translator to translate not only the words, but also the 
“non-spoken” communication like gestures. Thus a good 
communication is very delicate and important during negotiations and 
strategic alliances. 
Another very well known difference is the view on the individual. 
While western cultures tend to see the individual as the most important 
part of the society, many Asian individuals see themselves less as an 
individual, but more as a part of a collective. It is very important for the 
international management if a culture is primarily individualistic or 
primarily collective. Negotiations, motivations, and decision-making 
have to be adjusted to these local circumstances. These differences can 
be seen in a recent study. Individuals from 38 countries were asked, 
which method of working they prefer:71 
• Everyone is his own chef. Every individual decides the most on 
his own and works most of the time alone. 
• Work takes place in the group and everyone helps the other. 
Decisions are made by considering the opinion of every group 
member. 
Only 12% of the French and 14% of the Germans were able to see 
themselves in option B, while 64% of the Japanese identified 
themselves with this solution. 
Thus there can be big problems in decision-making and also during 
work when Germans or Frenchmen work together with Japanese. 
The next difference can be seen in the sensing of “Time”. When 
western people have to describe past, present, and future, they describe 
them as a sequential progression, while Japanese see them more cyclic 
or “polychronic”.  Western societies see time as a priceless resource, as 
71 Trompenars, F. (1994) 
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can be seen in the saying “time is money”. In contrast, Asian cultures 
tend to see time as an indefinite, boundless resource. This can lead to 
misunderstandings in everyday business life. For instance in western 
cultures everyone is expected to be on time and to finish his work 
according to the deadlines, which were set before. In Japan, time is not 
seen as that important. Thus the priority of tasks can be estimated 
differently. Also the “adequate” duration of negotiations differs. 
Western managers often get nervous and want to end the meeting, 
while the Japanese side wants to take more time. This can be seen as an 
advantage of Japanese negotiators, because they can use this to get in a 
better position. These misunderstandings can complicate the relation to 
foreign partners. 
Another difference is the religion. Today, religion looses more and 
more importance, but it still shapes a society‘s values. An examination 
of different religions would be too long here, but it is very important to 
keep differences in religions in mind when interacting with people from 
other religions. 
Concluding there are many different problems that can occur on this 
layer of the model and all have to be addressed carefully when 
interacting in order to avoid offences or misunderstandings.  
5.4.3 Social relationships and commitments 
On the basis of cultural values, social relationships are built. The 
individual is living in a social environment and tries to live up to his 
own expectations and the ones of the culture. Thus a manger has to be 
informed about the background of everyone he has to lead. Some of the 
factors, which can influence the relationship, will be examined here. 
5.4.3.1 Power Distance 
Power distance is defined as "the extent to which it the less powerful 
members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and 
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except that power is distributed unequally".72 The power distance 
concept is clearly more far-reaching than the work place alone. The 
power distance is often reflected in the hierarchical organisation of 
companies, the respect that is expected to be shown by the student 
towards his teacher, the political forms of decentralisation and 
centralisation, by the belief in society that inequalities among people 
should be minimised, or that they are expected and desired. 
Examples of countries with a high power distance include Mexico, the 
Arab countries and India. Countries that score a low power distance are, 
for example, Israel, Sweden and Ireland. Also within Europe big 
differences can be found. While Germany and Sweden are countries 
with low power distance, France has a very high one. These differences 
can also lead to misunderstandings. 
5.4.3.2 Labour Unions 
One completely different point is the role of Labour Unions. Between 
the countries exist many differences in their attitudes towards labour 
unions. The goals of the unions do not differ much, but the way they 
pursue them. In Western Europe the Unions have more powerful 
lobbies, which try to influence the local politics. Another difference is 
the probability of strike. In individualistic countries, the unions 
organize strikes more often than for instance in Japan. In 1993 German 
companies lost 593 000 man-days, while Japanese companies lost only 
116 000. Another difference is that a member of a Japanese union does 
not loose his loyalty to his employer. 
5.4.4 Legal and politic norms 
It is no surprise that laws differ between the states. This is a very 
obvious fact and it is rather easy to deal with this because normally 
laws are written down in some way. This problem is easy to see and 
easy to solve by gathering information about the foreign legal system, 
especially about: 
72 Hofstede, G. 1980, p. 28 
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• Rights of the individual in family and state 
• The different forms of cooperation 
• Competition law and commercial law 
• Rights and duties of the partners 
• Laws for the relation to employees including the role of labour 
unions 
• Regulations for foreign trade 
• Tax laws 
But there are also problems, which are more hidden; for example, law 
has another significance in Japan than in western societies. In western 
societies courts solve conflicts, while Japanese managers tend to avoid 
conflicts in advance. 
5.4.5 Task-Environment 
This is the result of the before-mentioned aspects of the cultural 
differences in strategic alliances. It encompasses the entirety of all 
business relationships. Unfortunately this can only be examined for 
particular partners. 
5.4.6 Conclusion 
Krieger examined the cultural influences on strategic alliance in theory 
at the example of France, Germany and Japan and showed the results in 
a life-phase-matrix: 
Factor\Phase Strategic Decision and Configuration
Choice of the 
Partner Management 
 Ger-Fra Ger-Jap Ger-Fra Ger-Jap Ger-Fra Ger-Jap 
 90 
Natural 
Circum-
stances 
2 2 2 2 3 3 
Knowledge of 
Processes and 
cultural 
determined 
moral 
Concepts 
3 3 3 2 2 1 
Social 
relationships 
and commit-
ments 
3 3 3 2 2 1 
Legal and 
politic norms 2 2 1 1 2 2 
Task-
Environment 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Rating for the success of a strategic alliance: 
1 = very important 
2 = important 
3 = inferior significance 
4 = no significance 
Exhibit 14: The importance of the different layers in different phases73 
This matrix shows that there are no irrelevant cultural factors when 
building and managing a strategic alliance. The differences in relevance 
                                                     
73 Krieger, C. (2001), p. 246; the original matrix is more detailed, but we did 
not want to go too far into detail and thus calculated the means of the more-
detailed values. 
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between forming an alliance between a German and a French and a 
German and a Japanese company are very low.  
The first factor, the natural circumstances loose relevance, when the 
alliance evolves. The reason is that there is no way to change the 
circumstances, once the alliance is built up. The second factor, the 
“knowledge of processes and cultural determined moral concepts” is 
gaining relevance over time. The same applies for “Social relationships 
and commitments”. During the formation of an alliance, these factors 
play a small role in the process because the obstacles they hold can be 
overcome. But once the alliance is formed, they have to be considered 
carefully. The last two factors, “Legal and politic norms” and “Task-
Environment”, have to be considered carefully in every phase of the 
alliance. 
According to Bleicher (1989) Top Managers can address all these 
problems by  
• Sending managers into the alliance to gain intercultural 
experience 
• Competence and impartiality of deployed employees 
• Offering awards for successful alliances 
After all the it is very important to recognize the cultural differences: 
“If we fail to recognize cultural differences and choose to maintain 
staunchly ethnocentric approaches, we condemn the world to 
divisiveness and its own demise [..]. Corporations can use their 
transnational status, their creative public-private partnerships, and their 
ever-growing network of alliances in ways that benefit and enrich their 
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worldwide constituencies or in ways that impoverish us all. The 
challenge is immense. The importance is without bound.”74 
5.5 Exchange – Integration 
This part distinguishes strategic alliances using the way resources are 
shared between the partners. Although resources play a central role in 
the formation of strategic alliances, conventional theories on strategic 
alliances have tended to emphasize structural elements within the 
alliances, such as market imperfections75 or control mechanisms76 
rather than the resources themselves. These conventional theories 
explain the circumstances under which resources should be obtained 
from strategic alliances, as opposed to being bought from the market or 
internalised within the firm. Theses theories say little about “how” the 
resources should be shared.  
Basically, we distinguish between two kinds of resource-sharing 
schemes in alliances: the first being the case where a partner offers a 
resource in exchange for another resource from the counterpart, the 
second being the case where both partners pool their resources for a 
common purpose.  
The first can be referred to as an ‘exchange alliance’, within which 
resources are first exchanged and then utilized independently by each 
partner. In exchange alliances, although the objectives of the partners 
are distinct, nevertheless they cooperate in some way to achieve their 
respective objectives. The resources are shared outside the 
organization. An alliance-participant makes use of its partner’s 
resources without bringing them into its own organization. For 
example, in a consigned manufacturing agreement, a firm provides its 
designs and product technologies to combine with the manufacturing 
74 Schuppert, D, Papmehl, A., and Walsh, I. (1994) 
75 Beamish, P. (1985); Harrigan, K.R. (1984); Stopford  J.M. and Wells, L.T. 
(1972) 
76 Beamish, P and Banks, J.C. (1987); Buckey, P. and Casson, M. (1988); 
Hennart, J.-F. (1988) 
 capabilities of its partner in manufacturing a product. The firm makes 
use of its partner’s manufacturing capabilities, but has no intention of 
annexing them. This kind of alliance is shown in exhibit 15. 
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Exhibit 15: Example for an ‘exchange alliance’ based on Porter’s model of 
a value chain 
The alliance facilitates only an exchange of resources between the 
partners with each one performing its activities independently. This 
allows specialisation for each partner. The exchange alliance can have 
all kinds of motives like “access to the market”, “access to new 
technologies”, or “leaving the market”. It is rather simple to form and 
abandoned more easily than an integration alliance. The most important 
success factor is to check for alternatives before entering the alliance, 
because it is crucial to find the best partner. But also equilibrium 
between the partners is very important to avoid dissatisfaction about the 
resources the other partner can give into the alliance. As a special case, 
an exchange alliance can also happen between equal levels of the value 
chain. For instance, two companies exchanging knowledge for research 
and development without actually building combined research facilities 
and organizations. 
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 The second may be referred to as an ‘integration alliance’, wherein 
resources are integrated within a certain organization designed by the 
partners to perform prescribed functions which serve a common 
purpose for the partners, although the partners’ ultimate goals will still 
remain distinct. This kind of alliance allows a firm to internalise the 
resources owned by its partner. While specialization is often the aim of 
exchange alliances, synergies are the main objective of integration 
alliances. For example, partners can agree to combine their purchasing 
in order to gain more bargaining power. In an integration alliance, they 
would then Form one department for purchasing and send their orders 
to this department: 
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Exhibit 16:Example for an ‘integration alliance' based on Porter’s model 
of a value chain 
Of course the alliance can also take place between supporting activities 
like research and development. In this case, the different facilities in 
research and development are combined and build a new one. 
There is more concern about opportunism in integration alliances than 
exchange alliances, as the parties will invariably contribute less to the 
alliance, while gaining more from it. On the other hand the parties are 
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much more dependent on each other and thus the risk for opportunistic 
behaviour decreases. The most important motive of integration 
alliances is to achieve synergies. Thus integration alliances also have to 
be more structured because the success of integration alliances depends 
on synergies, which can only be realized through the strong 
commitments of the parties involved. The ability to realize these 
synergies is also the most important success factor for integration 
alliances. However also personal factors and similar strategies are not 
unimportant for the success of an integration alliance. 
Chen and Chen77 conducted a study about how different kinds of 
resources are shared between the partners. They found that “firms 
entering strategic alliances with the desire to access their partners’ 
production or marketing resources tend to choose an exchange alliance, 
whereas those with the desire to access their partners’ R&D resources 
tend to choose an integration alliance.”78. And that “alliance partners 
offering each other complementary resources will tend to enter an 
exchange alliance, whereas those offering similar resources for the 
purpose of synergies will tend to enter an integration alliance”.  
5.6 Equity Joint Venture (EJV) – Contractual 
alliances 
While conventional theories are often geared towards the explanation of 
EJVs79, we will also focus on the difference between EJV and 
contractual alliances. The latter is often ignored, but is becoming 
increasingly important in the field of strategic alliances.  
Contractual alliances offer a number of advantages over EJVs such as 
greater flexibility, easier dissolution, a lower public profile, reduced 
legal encumbrances, ease of negotiation and renegotiation and a more 
77 Chen, H, Chen, T.-J. (2003) 
78 Chen, H, Chen, T.-J.  (2003), p. 6 
79 E.g. Killing , P. (1983); Beamish, P. (1984) 
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transient and less institutionalised relationship between the partners.80 
On the other hand transaction cost theory tries to explain, why EJVs 
may be superior to contracts. According to the transaction cost theory, 
the choice of an EJV as an alternative to market or hierarchy is 
explained by coordination and appropriation costs. The appropriation 
problem, which originates from pervasive behavioural uncertainty and 
contacting problems, can be resolved by joint equity ownership that 
defines the power of hierarchical control by the respective partners. The 
greater the appropriation concerns, the more hierarchical control is 
desirable in organizing the alliance, and the more likely that an EJV 
will be chosen over contracts.81 The cost of coordination increases if it 
is difficult to anticipate and evaluate the activities of the counterpart. 
An EJV may overcome that difficulty by providing mechanisms for 
internal monitoring and supervision. A problem of EJVs is the possible 
clash of different cultures. For an EJV a special organization is built 
and people from both involved companies have to work in this 
organization. Thus the contact between the cultures is most of the times 
more intense than in a contractual alliance, where most of the 
employees remain in their own organization. EJV also need to be at 
least of a “critical size” because rather big efforts are needed to build an 
EJV. Thus according to Chen & Chen (2003) small firms tend to prefer 
contractual alliances as opposed to EJVs. A good example of an EJV is 
the alliance between DaimlerChrysler AG, Hyundai Motor Company, 
and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, who founded a joint venture 
company in 2002 for the design, development, and engineering of a 
new family of in-line four cylinder gasoline engines. Global Engine 
Alliance L.L.C. jointly develops these engines through the combined 
resources of all three companies. The engines are to be used in future 
generations of vehicles of the Chrysler Group, Mitsubishi Motors, and 
Hyundai Motor. The joint venture company is owned equally by all 
three companies and is be located in the United States. By combining 
resources, the engine will have the most competitive technologies of the 
Chrysler Group, Hyundai and Mitsubishi. Each company will produce 
80 Johnson, J.L., Cullen, J.B., Sakano, T. and Teknouchi (1996) 
81 Gulati, R. and Singh, H. (1998) 
 the world-class engine for future vehicle applications. Under the new 
joint venture, Hyundai has the lead responsibility for implementing the 
decisions of the joint venture company for design, development and 
engineering. The initial production of this new engine is expected to 
take place during 2004 or 2005. According to the CEOs of the three 
companies, this alliance can also be the beginning of a closer 
relationship. 
In conclusion, contractual alliances are much easier to build and to 
dissolute, while EJV require more planning and commitment of both 
partners, but offers also better possibilities to save transaction costs.  
5.7 Size and size differences 
Size and size differences are very important if strategic alliances are 
considered. In strategic alliances a balance between both partners is 
needed to become successful. Equilibrium provides the partners with 
contentedness and faith. Such a balance is difficult to achieve in an 
asymmetric sized alliance. It can be distinguished between three basic 
types: Those three types result from the combination of small and big 
companies.  
Strategic alliances between two or more big companies have the 
prerequisites to achieve a balanced strategic alliance. The bureaucratic 
structure of such a constellation is normally compatible. Nevertheless 
the balance can be disturbed if one partner contributes super 
proportional more of efforts and resources into the strategic alliance 
than the other one. Thus the strategic alliance may suffer or may be 
aborted in the worst case because one partner gets dissatisfied.   
Another type of a strategic alliance is the constellation of a big and a 
small company. The main problem is that the absolute contribution of 
resources and efforts into the strategic alliance means relatively a much 
higher contribution for the smaller company.  
 
Resources Resources  of the small
company 
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Exhibit 17: Resource contribution of asymmetric sized strategic alliances  
 
In the figure the resource contribution of the big and the smaller 
company is visualized. It is obvious that the smaller company nearly 
contributes half of their resources into the strategic alliance. This can 
also lead to dissatisfaction in the smaller company and can disturb the 
relationship between the partners significantly. Another problem is the 
frequently occurring bureaucratic structures or different operational 
practises in big companies, which can lead to dissonances between the 
companies. These differences imply unequal power ratio in favour of 
the bigger company, which can lead to an opportunistic behaviour.  
In practise you can find such a constellation very often in the 
biotechnology- and high-tech sector. Normally the bigger company 
provides for instance its distribution channels and the small company 
provides some high-tech innovations. Doz and Hamel suggest that size 
differences in organizational contexts, often stemming from size 
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differences between partners, do more to undermine alliances than do 
differences in national culture.82 
The third possibility is the constellation of two or more small 
companies. Those companies will work together to achieve a critical 
size and benefit from economics of scale. Besides this constellation is 
similar to the “big-big” constellation and the prerequisites for a 
balanced strategic alliance is fulfilled.  
Concluding many problems can be avoided in a strategic alliance of 
equal sized companies. Asymmetric sized strategic alliances need a 
much more careful management of relationship of the involved 
companies. The companies should bring in the same amount of 
resources. Factors like trust and good will are important to succeed.  
5.8 Analysis 
We have shown that every strategic alliance has many different 
characteristics which define it and which give important implications 
for practice. When considering all the different dimensions, for instance 
the importance of the different success factors can change, and an 
almost indefinite number of different types of strategic alliances occur.  
Of course, we did not mention all dimensions in our thesis, but we think 
we chose the most important ones. Also there could be other very 
important ones, which we did neither find nor developed. 
We will show the complexity at several examples: 
A first example is the importance of culture when forming a strategic 
alliance. When a manager only considers whether the alliance is an 
integration alliance or an exchange alliance, he will come to the 
conclusion that culture is a very important fact when forming an 
integration alliance. In contrast to that, culture is less important in an 
exchange alliance because the companies have less points of contact 
82 Doz, Y. and Hamel, G. (1998) 
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here. Thus he will be careful in forming an integration alliance with a 
company with different culture. But as soon as he also considers the 
sizes of the companies, he may see that both companies are small ones 
and thus the problem of different cultures is not that important because 
smaller companies are more flexible in handling different cultures. 
Thus a small size of the companies gives a tendency towards an 
integration alliance.  
On the other hand small companies form EJVs less often. But not 
forming an EJV gives a tendency against an integration alliance 
because EJVs are often combined with integration alliances. 
Now we showed two different implications following out of the fact 
that two companies want to enter a strategic alliance: The first gives a 
tendency towards an integration alliance, the second a tendency against 
it. This shows how the different dimensions are interdigitated and how 
many different implications can be drawn out of them. There is a big 
amount of such combinations and disregarding of only one of them can 
lead to completely different or even wrong results. 
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6 Conclusion 
6.1 Consolidated findings 
In its considerations, the corporate management has to keep in mind 
that a strategic alliance as an instrument between market and hierarchy 
is only one of several different options. Other possible options are 
acquisitions or mergers. Once the decision for a strategic alliance is 
made, the question of the specific design has to be answered. For this, 
several basic types from an informal agreement to the foundation of an 
equity joint venture are available. The choice of the specific design 
depends on the situation and is very complicated as we showed before. 
The various theoretical approaches presented in chapter 3 are not 
advanced enough to explain the existence of strategic alliances. The 
theoretical approaches cannot give any implications for practical 
decision-making concerning strategic alliances yet. It is also not 
predictable that these implications can be given in the nearer future 
because today’s theories are not even able to fully explain the existence 
of a theoretical and simple type of alliance not to mention all the 
different forms that occur in practice. There is still more need for 
research to develop new theories which are able to accomplish this. 
As we have seen, motives and success factors are influenced by all 
types of the described forms of the strategic alliances, but on the other 
hand only a few factors influence special forms of strategic alliances, 
for instance the four archetypes can be mentioned here. Through the 
evolution of strategic alliances the subject obtains some kind of 
dynamic aspects. This adds a new dynamic dimension to strategic 
alliances. Also all mentioned static motives and factors play an 
important role in the evolutionary process. Thus strategic alliances are 
both a static and a dynamic entity. The connection between static and 
dynamic factors in theory is necessary, which also increases the 
complexity of the subject.  
But dynamic aspects do not only arise from the alliance itself. Also the 
environment is changing dynamically and often unpredictably. A 
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continuously changing environment, e.g. proceeding globalization, can 
cause significant changes in motives and intentions of the partners of 
the strategic alliance. This necessarily leads to dramatic changes in the 
form of the alliance. Therefore it is the task of the management to make 
constantly the necessary adaptations. Even a perfectly formed strategic 
alliance will fail if the management does not conduct these changes. 
The static complexity of strategic alliances is caused by a high number 
of dimensions, which are needed to characterize a strategic alliance, 
and their heterogeneity. Almost every single of the dimensions 
mentioned in chapter 5 is applicable to every single alliance and has 
little or no correlation to the other dimensions. By combining all these 
dimensions, an almost unlimited number of types of strategic alliances 
can be distinguished. Unfortunately, these dimensions and their 
consequences are not independent from each other. These interrelations 
lead to an amount of different types of strategic alliances that is very 
difficult to manage. In chapter 4 and 5, we described in detail, which 
dimensions are the most important to keep an eye on.  
The fragmentation and the incompleteness of the literature concerning 
strategic alliances in our opinion reflect the complexity of this subject. 
The high complexity of the subject leads to difficulties in forming 
strategic alliances and thus to the very high rate of failure.  
The different perspectives show a well-differentiated picture of the 
complexity of strategic alliances and improve the decision-making. 
Thus we were successful in developing a differentiated view of 
strategic alliances. 
During our thesis we think we have proven that it is not enough only to 
look at one or two of the dimensions as most of the literature does. 
Such a narrow perspective leads most of the times to a forged and 
incomplete view on the examined alliance. Thus a much broader 
perspective is needed to fully understand the influences on the alliance. 
This implicates additional need for research in this part. 
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Even though the primary audience of this thesis are scientists and 
researchers, managers can use it as well. The former can use this thesis 
to get a deeper understanding of strategic alliances and especially of the 
different dimensions needed to categorize them. It can also be used for 
a basis for all kinds of research in the field of strategic alliances. On the 
other hand, managers can also use this thesis to get a deeper 
understanding of strategic alliances which leads to better insight into 
the problems which may arise. 
6.2 Achievement of Goals 
We were able to proof the deficiencies of a narrow perspective on 
strategic alliances. We described the most relevant aspects to build a 
more differentiated view. The differentiated view is not all-embracing. 
We knew this already when we began to write the thesis. Nevertheless 
we were still surprised by the high complexity of the subject and due to 
this the differentiated view is still expandable. 
Concluding we think, that we achieved most of our goals and got a 
deeper insight into strategic alliances. 
6.3 Further need for research  
Even though strategic alliances have been give a lot of attention during 
the late eighties and the nineties, the topic is still not very thoroughly 
explored and there is still much room for further research. The view, we 
presented here, leaves much space for being enlarged and being 
explored more in detail. Also every single aspect, we showed, can still 
be examined more deeply and more thoroughly. These theoretical 
studies have to be done before a practical study can be conducted. This 
topic is subject to radical changes, triggered by continuously changing 
environmental factors and challenges for the management. 
It is predictable that strategic networks consisting out of many strategic 
alliances will become more important in the future. The research in this 
part is still very rudimentary. Thus the need for more research in the 
area of strategic networks is very big. 
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6.4 Outlook in the future 
We expect that the future research will make progress in describing 
strategic alliances. At the same time strategic alliances will gain 
importance and their number will still increase. Simultaneously, the 
complexity will raise, e.g. because of the augmented appearance of 
strategic networks. Therefore it is not clear if strategic alliances in the 
future will have a higher probability for success. 
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